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Preface: The Continuity of Government
The Continuity of the Three Branches of 
Government. September 11th dispelled the 
United States’ naive attitude towards security of 
its homeland.  The three airplanes that hit the 
World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon 
caused severe damage and a horrific loss of life. 
A fourth plane was downed in a field in 
Pennsylvania by brave passengers who stormed 
the cockpit.  That fourth plane was headed toward 
Washington, likely towards the U.S. Capitol. 
Al Qaeda targeted our top government leaders. 
A lesser-known fifth plane – probably headed 
for the White House – was likely prevented from 
its course by the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui. 
Had this part of the plan been successfully 
executed, September 11th would have brought 
additional tragedy in loss of life and destruction 
of symbolic buildings.  It would have hindered 
the ability of our government to respond to the 
attack.  In short, Al Qaeda has shown interest in 
incapacitating the leadership of our govern-
ment.  And where Al Qaeda has failed in the 
past, such as in the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing, it has returned to strike again.
The Commission. The Continuity of Government 
Commission is a private AEI-Brookings com-
mission funded by the Carnegie, Hewlett, 
Packard, and MacArthur Foundations. It is com-
prised of members with experience in various 
branches of government and expertise in the 
daily functioning of our government.  It was 
founded in the fall of 2002 to consider how each 
of our three branches of government might 
reconstitute themselves after a catastrophic 
attack on Washington, D.C. and to make recom-
mendations for statutory and constitutional 
changes that would improve the continuity of our 
basic institutions.  In June of 2003, the commis-
sion issued its first report on the Continuity of 
Congress.1  In that report the commission unani-
mously recommended a constitutional amend-
ment that would provide for filling mass vacancies 
or mass incapacitations in the U.S. House and 
Senate through temporary appointments until 
special elections could be held to fill the vacan-
cies.  Without such an amendment, an attack 
might cause Congress to fall below the quorum 
requirement for conducting business and poten-
tially disable Congress for many months until the 
numerous vacancies could be filled.  The report 
spawned much debate in Congress, including 
many hearings and the introduction of a variety 
of amendments to address this problem.
1 The Continuity of Government Commission. The Congress: Preserving 
Our Institutions: The First Report of the Continuity of Government Com-
mission, May 2003
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The Presidency. This is the second report of 
the Continuity of Government Commission. 
This report addresses our system of Presidential 
succession and how we would replace a presi-
dent after a catastrophic terrorist attack to 
ensure the proper functioning of our govern-
ment.  Unlike the current provisions for con-
gressional continuity which do not include any 
institutional protections in the case of an attack 
causing mass vacancies or mass incapacita-
tions, there is a Presidential succession system 
in place.  However, it is the finding of this com-
mission that the current system would be inad-
equate in the face of a catastrophic attack that 
would kill or incapacitate multiple individuals 
in the line of succession. The current system 
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currently Chairman of the Trilateral 
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2001, he served as the 25th U.S. Ambassador 
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in November 1997, Foley served as the 49th 
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co-author of the 1992 Industrial Base and 
Defense Conversion Act which enabled com-
munities and individuals to respond to the 
downsizing of the defense industry. He also 
authored the National Amber Alert Law that 
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tion in the department, and before that she 
was General Counsel of the Department of 
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T. MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie 
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The Presidency 11
Fred Iklé is a Distinguished Scholar at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
and currently engaged in studies about the 
impact of technology on national security and 
the prospects for democracy. He is a member 
of the Defense Policy Board, a governor of the 
Smith Richardson Foundation, a Director 
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bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-
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advisers. From 1973 to 1977, he served 
Presidents Nixon and Ford as Director of the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
Since 1988, he has been Chairman of CMC 
Energy Services. He served for nine years as 
Director of the National Endowment for 
Democracy, and from 1999 to 2000 served as 
commissioner on the National Commission on 
Terrorism. He was Director and Chairman of 
Telos Corporation and Director of the Advisory 
Board of Zurich Financial Services. From 
1964 to 1967, Iklé was a professor of political 
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Negotiations of the Soviet Union on Nuclear 
and Space Arms in Geneva, before serving as 
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At 9:20 p.m., a passenger airliner takes off from 
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. 
The pilot, an Al Qaeda sympathizer, diverts the 
plane toward the Capitol Building, which is less 
than three miles away. There is no time to inter-
cept the plane, and anti-aircraft devices fail to 
bring it down before it crashes into the Capitol.
Emergency personnel arrive quickly, but they 
have difficulty reaching the House chamber. 
First responders finally make their way to the 
site of the crash and find many dead. Many 
others must be buried beneath the rubble that 
has collapsed upon them.
At 9:45 p.m., the military informs the Secretary 
of Agriculture that there is no contact with 
anyone else in the line of Presidential succes-
sion. The President, Vice President, Speaker of 
the House, and President pro tempore of the 
Senate cannot be found. No one can locate any 
other members of the cabinet, all of whom were 
in the House chamber.
The Secretary faces a dilemma. If everyone is 
dead, then he is to act as president of the United 
States.  There is no one else in the line of succes-
sion prescribed by the Presidential Succession 
Act of 1947.2  Military aides are encouraging 
him to take the oath of office so that he can begin 
acting as Commander-in-Chief.  But what if the 
President is still alive or what if someone else 
higher in the line of succession than the Secretary 
of Agriculture has survived this catastrophe after 
all? If the President were found alive and able, 
2 Presidential Succession Act of 1947; See appendix II 
Scenario: Confusion
The President begins his State of the Union address promptly at 
9:15 p.m., with the Speaker of the House and the Vice President sitting 
behind him. Virtually the entire House and Senate are in attendance. 
Five Supreme Court justices sit in the front row. With the exception of the 
Secretary of Agriculture, the entire cabinet is present, since by custom, one cabinet 
member is designated by the President and sent away to another location. Twenty million 
Americans are watching the speech on television.
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he could immediately resume his duties.  On the 
other hand, if he were found alive, but incapaci-
tated, the Secretary of Agriculture would, by law, 
act as president until the President were to 
recover.
Exactly how and when power would be trans-
ferred from a disabled president to the Secretary 
of Agriculture is unclear.  The Constitution, in 
the 25th Amendment, provides a detailed pro-
cedure for the Vice President to take over for a 
disabled president if he and a majority of the 
cabinet determine there to be a disability and 
Congress is notified.3  But this constitutional 
amendment does not apply to a lower level offi-
cial taking over for a disability, nor if a majority 
of the cabinet is not likely to be found alive. 
Neither does the Presidential Succession Act 
provide any details for taking over for such a 
disability.
The lack of clarity would grow if another higher 
ranking cabinet member were to be found alive 
after the Secretary of Agriculture assumes the 
presidency.  If any one of the President, Vice 
President, Speaker or President pro tempore were 
to be found alive, it is clear that that person 
would assume the presidency.  But if the Secretary 
of State, a cabinet member who comes before the 
Secretary of Agriculture in the line of succession, 
were to be found alive, there would be confusion 
in the law.  The Presidential Succession Act sug-
gests that the Secretary of Agriculture would 
remain president if a higher ranking cabinet 
member were to recover from incapacitation. 
The line of succession would pass by the Secretary 
of State, and the Secretary of Agriculture would 
continue to act as president.
3 Amendment XXV, United States Constitution; See appendix I
A more confusing scenario would arise if 
the Secretary of Agriculture were to assume 
the presidency and it turned out that the 
Secretary of State had been alive, but incom-
municado.  Who would be president – the 
Secretary of State who should have acted as 
president, or the Secretary of Agriculture, who 
had acted as president for possibly days, or 
maybe just hours, until the Secretary of State 
was found?
The Secretary of Agriculture hesitates.  Perhaps, 
he thinks, this decision would be better made 
when the rescuers have had more time to search 
the rubble.  But top military leaders encourage 
him to take the oath of office.  America needs a 
president.  Even a gap of several hours will not do. 
Foreign leaders are already calling to inquire. 
Foreign enemies might try to exploit the situation 
by acting against the United States or engaging in 
activities that the United States would not nor-
mally permit.  Who would control the nuclear 
codes if they were to be needed?  Who would be 
able to launch military action?  “America must 
have a president,” the military brass argue, “and 
it must have one now.”
Despite this pressure, the Secretary waits, and 
America is without a president.  Finally, at 
11:00 p.m., after calls from two former presi-
dents, the British Prime Minister and the 
Russian President, the Secretary agrees to 
resign from his current office, as required by 
the Presidential Succession Act, and take the 
Presidential oath of office.  The country is now 
governed by a man with a narrow expertise who, 
until yesterday, only a small percentage of 
Americans could identify.  After a short state-
ment on television, the new Acting President 
promises to speak again the following morning.
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Just after midnight, there is some good news.  A 
cry for help is heard in the rubble.  Apparently, 
a fallen section of the Capitol dome has trapped 
some survivors, but spared them from being 
crushed as most of their colleagues had been. 
Fifty people are found in this section, but some 
are dead, and almost all are severely injured.  It 
is clear that everyone else in the other parts of 
the rubble has perished.  
Rumors abound as to who is among the living. 
One network reports that the President was 
pronounced dead in the early morning.  Another 
network interviews a hospital worker who 
claims to have seen him alive and speaking to 
his staff in a hospital bed.  Similar rumors 
circle about the Vice President, the Speaker of 
the House and other members of Congress and 
the cabinet.
Over the course of the night, details emerge. 
Miraculously, the President has survived, 
although he is unconscious and fighting for his 
life.  The Vice President is not so lucky.  She 
succumbed to smoke inhalation shortly after the 
attack.  Perhaps the most remarkable case is 
the Speaker of the House, who is injured, but is 
well enough to sit up in his hospital bed and 
hold conversations with his doctors.  The 
President pro tempore of the Senate is dead. 
The others survivors include some staff, most of 
whom are severely injured, and twenty mem-
bers of Congress in addition to the Speaker. 
Fifteen of those members of Congress are 
unconscious and in critical condition, but four, 
like the Speaker, have escaped with injuries 
that are not life threatening.  All Senators are 
dead, as well as all of the cabinet members 
present and the five Justices of the Supreme 
Court who were in attendance.
While there is much rejoicing that the President 
is alive, he is unconscious, clearly not able to act 
as president, and it is doubtful that he will sur-
vive.  But the condition of the Speaker of the 
House is more promising.  He has painful inju-
ries, but he is strong enough to act as president. 
The Presidential Succession Act provides that a 
Speaker of the House may “bump” out a cabinet 
member who has assumed the presidency.  At 
noon, the Speaker of the House does just that. 
The Speaker resigns from Congress and from the 
Speakership, as the law requires, and takes the 
Presidential oath of office.  The former Secretary 
of Agriculture, who served as president for thir-
teen hours, now holds no office, as he was 
required to resign from his cabinet post in order 
to assume the presidency.  The Speaker of the 
House now acts as president.  America has had 
three presidents within the past fifteen hours.
The Speaker is a more prominent figure than 
the Secretary of Agriculture, but still relatively 
unknown in the country.  The most recent 
Gallup survey showed that only 30 percent of 
the American people had even heard his name, 
and fewer knew his position.  The Speaker, now 
the Acting President, begins to respond to the 
horrific attack on America.  He orders immedi-
ate covert action against targets in the Middle 
East and begins to plan for a major invasion of 
two countries that harbor terrorists.
The Speaker has little or no Congressional check 
on his actions.  The Senate is completely wiped 
out; no senators have survived.  The 17th 
Amendment allows state governors to make tem-
porary appointments to fill Senate vacancies 
until special elections can be held.4  In practice 
4 Amendment XVII, United States Constitution; See appendix I
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that means that most states will send replace-
ment Senators to Washington within a few days. 
Preplanning by Congress also ensures that the 
Senate will have an alternate location to meet 
either in Washington or somewhere else, since 
the Capitol building has been destroyed.
The House of Representatives is another story, as 
the Constitution only allows vacancies to be 
filled by special elections, and these elections 
take on average four months to administer.5  The 
Constitution provides that a majority of each 
house is required for a quorum to conduct busi-
ness.6  The twenty members of Congress who 
survived the attack are far short of the two hun-
dred and eighteen member majority.  Following 
the Constitution, there would be no Senate for 
several days, and no House of Representatives 
for several months, when special elections would 
fill the many vacant seats.
But some of the handful of living and able members 
of the House of Representatives have a different 
idea.  They know that there is a line of precedents 
in the House of Representatives that defines the 
quorum as a majority of those living, sworn and 
chosen.  This precedent was not established for 
emergency purposes, but merely to achieve a 
quorum when there were a couple of House vacan-
cies and low attendance for a vote.  Reading this 
precedent literally, if only twenty members of the 
House remained (which is the case) then only 
eleven of them would be needed to establish a 
quorum.  In other words, a small number of mem-
bers could function as the House.7
5 The Continuity of Government Commission. The Congress: Preserving 
Our Institutions: The First Report of the Continuity of Government Com-
mission, May 2003
6 Article I, Section 5, United States Constitution; See appendix I
7 The Continuity of Government Commission. The Congress: Preserving 
Our Institutions: The First Report of the Continuity of Government Com-
mission, May 2003
At first it seems that this precedent alone will not 
help the House, for though twenty members sur-
vive, only five are well enough to come to the 
chamber. But these House members know recent 
history.  They know that the House codified the 
precedent in its rules and added a provision to 
allow for a quorum even with incapacitated mem-
bers.  According to this rule, which was viewed 
as extremely dubious by constitutional scholars, 
even the five remaining able members could act 
as the House of Representatives, as long as three 
of them came to the floor to form a “quorum.”8
If this handful of House members chose to exer-
cise such a course of action, the House of 
Representatives might exist in name, but it 
would be a strange, unrepresentative, and in the 
eyes of many, an illegitimate body.  More trou-
bling, it would also affect the line of succession, 
for this small handful of members could elect a 
new Speaker of the House, who would be in line 
to be president should a vacancy arise.
In all of this mess, the Supreme Court is also effec-
tively disabled as five of its members are dead, 
and a federal statute requires that six members of 
the Court constitute a quorum for issuing a deci-
sion.9  The circuit and district courts are intact, 
but there is no court of final resort and no body to 
resolve conflicts among the circuits.
So the former Speaker continues to act as 
president with no Congress and no Supreme 
Court as checks on his power.  That evening, 
he declares martial law to restore order and 
8 See Williams, John Bryan. “How to Survive a Terrorist 
Attack: The Constitution’s Majority Quorum Requirement and the 
Continuity of Congress,” William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 48:1025, 
pages 1066-1067
9 Title 28, Chapter 1, Section 1. Number of justices; quorum, United 
States Code; See appendix II 
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protect against subsequent attacks (although 
many constitutional experts doubt he has that 
power), and he puts the country on the highest 
level of emergency preparedness.
With the country still in shock from the attacks 
and from the subsequent confusion, two days later, 
the President of the United States regains con-
sciousness.  At first doctors are cautious about his 
condition, but after learning about the events of 
the past few days, the President insists that he will 
resume his office.  After a day of recuperation, the 
President, noticeably frail, goes on national televi-
sion to announce that he has recovered sufficiently 
to serve as president again.
The 25th Amendment provides clear guidance 
that the Vice President will take over when the 
President is incapacitated (either if the President 
declares himself incapacitated or with the Vice 
President securing a majority of votes of the cabi-
net), but that the President will return when he is 
able.  Almost everyone agrees that the President is 
entitled to resume his office, even in this situation 
where there is no Vice President, but the 
Presidential Succession Act does not provide any 
guidelines as to how this will happen.10
To make matters worse, the former Speaker, who 
is acting as president, has serious doubts as to 
whether the President has sufficiently recov-
ered to resume his office.  Section 4 of the 25th 
Amendment would allow a vice president, with 
a majority of the cabinet, to challenge a presi-
dent’s declaration that he had recovered and 
was fit to resume the office, and the final dis-
pute would be decided by Congress.  But the 
amendment says nothing about these powers as 
10 See appendix II
they apply to a former Speaker serving as acting 
president.11 Furthermore, there is no cabinet, 
and there is no functioning Congress.  With 
these issues and the fragile state of the national 
psyche in mind, the former Speaker decides it 
would be too destabilizing to publicly raise the 
issue of the President’s ability.
In order to resume his duties, the President 
issues a written declaration that he is recov-
ered.  He had considered addressing such a 
declaration to Congress, but again the law is 
vague and the Congress is not up and working. 
After the written declaration is issued, the 
former Speaker, who has been acting as presi-
dent for three days, steps aside and he, like the 
Secretary of Agriculture before him, no longer 
holds any office due to his resignation from 
Congress and the Speakership.
The return of the President initially lifts the 
spirits of the American people.  The markets, 
which had closed for two days after the attack, 
and had declined sharply after opening, rebound 
significantly with the news.  But the initial 
euphoria starts to ebb when the President 
appears on television that evening to address 
the nation about his response to the attacks. 
Even the august setting of the Oval Office, per-
fect lighting and professional makeup cannot 
hide the fact that the President is not well.  His 
frequent pauses, confusion over basic facts, and 
general demeanor frighten rather than reassure 
the American public.  While few Americans are 
willing to publicly voice their concerns, there is 
growing sentiment that the nation might have 
been better off in the hands of the Speaker of 
the House or even the Secretary of Agriculture. 
11 Amendment XXV, United States Constitution; See appendix I
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But neither is eligible to return.  They hold no 
official position, and they are no longer in the 
line of succession.  In fact, it is not clear if there 
is anyone left in the line of succession.
The unspoken concerns of the American people 
prove to be warranted, as later that afternoon, 
the President appears at a photo opportunity 
with the Prime Minister of Denmark, who was in 
the United States on the day of the attack and 
who has not yet returned due to the paralysis of 
the transportation system.  At the photo-op, the 
President turns pale, collapses, and is rushed to 
a nearby hospital.  Hours later, news comes that 
the President has slipped into a coma and is in 
critical condition.
Now, chaos reigns.  Constitutional scholars appear 
on television programs, and the initial commen-
tary suggests the worst.  There is no one left in the 
line of succession.  There is no one who can act as 
president.  The President is in a coma.  The Vice 
President is dead.  The Speaker already served as 
acting president, but does not hold that office 
anymore as he was displaced when the President 
recovered.  The House of Representatives, by 
most constitutional scholars’ views, should not 
meet with only four members, and it will likely 
take months to elect the two hundred and eighteen 
members that the Constitution prescribes for a 
quorum.  Its four members, however, believe that 
they have a quorum, and that they can elect a new 
Speaker of the House, who by law would become 
the new President.
The Senate has not reconstituted itself yet to 
elect a president pro tempore, although it appears 
likely that gubernatorial appointments will fill 
vacancies in the very near term, and a new 
Senate will meet.  At that time, a new president 
pro tempore could be elected who would be in 
the line of succession and who could then 
assume the presidency.  But for now, it seems 
that there is no president, no Congress and no 
Court.  Who governs America?
After this initial bleak assessment, a few consti-
tutional commentators note that perhaps there 
is someone in the line of succession.  Many read 
the Presidential Succession Act to mean that 
acting cabinet secretaries are in the line of suc-
cession, as long as they have been confirmed by 
the Senate for secondary posts in the depart-
ment.  Each department has had someone in 
charge since the attack as each has its own 
internal line of succession.  Most of the depart-
ments are being run by the Undersecretary or 
other person in the capacity of “acting secre-
tary.”  Many constitutional scholars believe 
acting secretaries are in the line of succession, 
but there is significant dispute on this point.  If 
lower level cabinet members were unknown to 
the American people, surely acting secretaries 
rank even lower in their minds.
All agree that a more permanent solution is for 
the Senate to reconstitute itself and elect a new 
president pro tempore, who will then act as 
president.  Pressure mounts on a number of 
governors who have not yet made appointments 
to do so, and for the newly appointed Senators 
to meet at an alternate location.  It is likely that 
these concerns can be resolved within 24 hours, 
but what can we do now?
Intense interest centers on the Undersecretary 
of State, who is serving as acting Secretary of 
State.  Again, the military makes the argument 
that it is essential to have a president at all 
times, even if it will likely only be for a day or 
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two.  Bowing to this concern and public opinion, 
the Undersecretary resigns his position and 
takes the Presidential oath of office.  Governors 
rush to make appointments to fill Senate vacan-
cies.  The new Acting President performs a 
significant function by invoking a 1794 law that 
allows the President to reconvene Congress in 
the case of an emergency that prevents it from 
meeting in its chambers.12
  
The five remaining members of the House of 
Representatives begin to suggest that they do 
not want the Senate to pick the new President. 
All of the senators will be appointed.  The 
House is “the people’s house” and the remain-
ing members have been elected by the people, 
albeit their districts represent just over one 
percent of the nation.  If the House were to act 
first in choosing a new Speaker, (before the 
Senate can elect its leader) then that speaker 
may act as president.  But if the House waits 
until the Senate constitutes itself, then the 
President pro tempore will become president.
Twenty-four hours later, eighty newly appointed 
Senators arrive at Fort McNair in Washington, 
a location Congress had earlier designated as 
a potential alternative meeting place.  A few 
states have not yet made their appointments, 
but by the following day, there is a nearly full 
complement of over ninety senators. 
( Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Oregon, Massachusetts, 
and Alaska have not sent senators because 
their laws do not provide for temporary appoint-
ments, only elections, which will occur within 
a few months.)13 
12 CHAPT. XVII – An Act to authorize the President of the United 
States in certain cases to alter the place for holding a session of 
Congress. (Approved April 3, 1794); See appendix II
13 Article I, Section 3 United States Constitution; 2 U.S.C. Sec. 8. Vacan-
cies; Amendment XXVII, United States Constitution; See appendix III
With ninety senators, the new Senate goes about 
its most important task, electing a new presi-
dent pro tempore.  In normal times, the President 
pro tempore is an honorific position given to the 
longest serving senator of the majority party. 
The criterion for choosing the President pro 
tempore always leads to the selection of some-
one with substantial experience, but sometimes 
also results in the selection of someone whose 
age and health would not allow him or her to 
serve as president.  In 2001, ninety-eight year 
old Strom Thurmond served as president pro 
tempore.  In this instance, the Senate knows that 
it must make a choice of the utmost importance. 
Fortunately, one of the Senators appointed to fill 
the vacancy is a distinguished former Secretary 
of State who commands the respect of both par-
ties.  The Senate quickly coalesces behind him 
and elects him president pro tempore. 
Immediately after he is elected, he resigns his 
office and his Senate seat and takes the 
Presidential oath of office, displacing the former 
Undersecretary of State, who is serving as 
acting president.
Finally, it seems that there is some clarity to the 
confusion of the past week, but there are a few 
remaining issues.  First, the President is still 
alive, although in a coma and very ill.  Were he 
to recover again, he could displace the Acting 
President again.  Second, there is no function-
ing Congress.  The Senate can operate, but the 
House will not have more than a few members 
for several months, and many are wary of the 
constitutional fiction that a handful of members 
might operate the body in the short term. 
Without a bicameral Congress, there can be no 
legislation passed, no declarations of war, no 
appropriations, no legislative response to the 
attacks as there was after 9/11.  Third, the 
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Supreme Court is decimated.  The Acting 
President could make appointments to the 
Court and the Senate could confirm them, but 
there are some questions as to whether an 
unelected president should appoint five 
Justices—for terms of “good behavior”—who 
would shape the direction of the court for many 
years to come.
The President’s condition does not improve.  He 
dies two weeks later.  Now the country knows 
that the Acting President will serve for the three 
years remaining in the presidential term.  Four 
months later the House meets again, having 
filled its vacancies by special elections. 
America is finally on the road to recovering 
from the devastating attack on its leadership.
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Our system of Presidential succession is 
governed by a number of constitutional and 
statutory provisions.  The original Constitution 
authorizes Congress to write a Presidential 
succession act, and we have had three in our 
history.  There are also provisions of the 12th, 
20th, and 25th Amendments that affect suc-
cession.  We are fortunate as a nation never to 
have had a simultaneous vacancy in the presi-
dency and vice presidency, but, unfortunately, 
9/11 underlined the fact that such vacancies 
are a very real possibility.  If such a scenario 
were to occur, we would have to test our vari-
ous succession provisions laid out in the 
Constitution and the Presidential Succession 
Act.  This section lays out the constitutional 
and statutory basis of Presidential succession 
and provides a brief history of how the current 
system developed.
The Original Constitution
Article II Section I of the 
Constitution
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution con-
tains the provision that undergirds most of our 
Presidential succession system.  The relevant 
section reads:
In Case of the Removal of the President 
from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or 
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties 
of the said Office, the Same shall devolve 
on the Vice President, and the Congress 
may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, 
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the 
President and Vice President, declaring 
what Officer shall then act as President, 
Presidential Succession: 
Is Our Current System Adequate to Protect 
the Presidency Against Catastrophic Attacks?
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and such Officer shall act accordingly, 
until the Disability be removed, or a 
President shall be elected.14
This constitutional provision provides that the 
Vice President should assume the powers of the 
presidency if the presidency were to become 
vacant. But, it also delegates to Congress the 
power to specify a further line of succession if 
both offices were vacant.
The language in the constitutional provision is 
relatively clear, but a few details are worth 
noting.
First, the framers recognized that there were 
different ways that the office of the President 
could become vacant–through removal, death, 
resignation or inability.  The first three involve 
the President permanently vacating the office, 
while the latter may involve a temporary 
vacancy.  In all of these cases, the Vice 
President acts as president, and Congress may 
provide by law for further provisions related to 
each of these cases.
Second, the Constitution specifies that Congress 
may declare “what Officer shall then act as 
President.”  The key is word “Officer,” capital-
ized in the Constitution.  The term probably 
means “Officer of the United States,” which 
would mean officials in the executive, but 
not the legislative, branch of government 
would be eligible to be in the line of succession. 
But the term has been controversial, and at 
various times in our history, including today, 
the Presidential succession act has included 
congressional leaders in the line.  A line of 
14 Article II, Section 1, United States Constitution; See appendix I
thought running from James Madison to Akhil 
Amar holds that it is unconstitutional to 
have congressional leaders in the line of 
succession.15
Third, the constitutional provision allows for 
Congress to make a provision for a special elec-
tion to fill the presidential vacancy.  There was 
debate at the constitutional convention over this 
provision, and the final language was agreed 
upon that would allow a successor to the 
President to serve either until the next general 
election at the end of a term or until the comple-
tion of a special election provided for by law.  In 
fact, the first Presidential Succession Act 
explicitly provided for a special presidential 
election if both the presidency and vice presi-
dency were vacant and the vacancies occurred 
early in the term.
Congress’s Presidential 
Succession Acts and the 
20th Amendment
The First Presidential 
Succession Act (1792-1886)
The framers recognized the importance of 
passing a succession act, but they could not 
agree on a specific statute in the first Congress. 
It was the second Congress that passed the 
first Presidential Succession Act.  The most 
divisive issue in the debate was the question of 
whether congressional leaders could be 
included in the line of succession.  As a matter 
15 See Amar, Akhil Reed and Amar, Vikram David. “Is the Presi-
dential Succession Law Constitutional?” 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1995-1996. 
Pages 118-123
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of principle, the debate broke down into two 
camps, one of which believed the word 
“Officer” clearly meant “Officer of the United 
States” and thus expressly forbade leaders of 
Congress.  The other camp argued that the 
term was more expansive and included other 
“officers,” and the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and Speaker of the House are clearly 
officers of the Congress.  It was in this debate 
that James Madison made an impassioned 
argument that the Constitution did not allow 
Congress to include Congressional leaders in 
the line.16
But in truth, the real argument was not over 
principle but politics.  An anti-Jefferson fac-
tion wanted to ensure that Jefferson would not 
be in the line of succession, while Jefferson’s 
supporters wanted him to be in the line of 
succession.  Ultimately, the Senate was con-
trolled by pro-administration Senators and 
the first Presidential Succession Act was 
passed with no cabinet members, and only 
two Congressional officers.  The law, which 
would remain in effect for the next ninety-
four years, placed the President pro tempore 
of the Senate followed by the Speaker of the 
House.17  In this debate, Madison protested 
bitterly, and his arguments were revived (and 
ultimately accepted) in the debate over the 
Second Presidential Succession Act in 
1886.18  America fortunately never needed to 
use its provisions, although in several 
instances it came close.
16 See Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential 
Succession. Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. Pages 57-58
17 Presidential Succession Act of 1792; See appendix II
18 United States Congress. “Public Acts of the Forty-Ninth Congress”. 
Statues of the United States of America. First Session, 49th Congress.  
Washington: GPO, 1886; 1-2  
The period from 1792 to 1886 saw the death of 
four presidents, five vice presidents, the 
extended incapacitation and eventual death of 
President Garfield, the near removal of President 
Andrew Johnson, and an election controversy 
that was not resolved until two days before the 
inauguration. There was no provision to replace 
a vice president, as there is today with Section 
2 of the 25th Amendment.  If the Vice President 
died or the President died and the Vice President 
succeeded to the presidency, the President pro 
tempore of the Senate was next in line to be 
president.  From 1792 to 1886 when the law 
was in operation, there was no vice president 
about a quarter of the time including a seven 
year period during which there was no vice 
president for all but one month.19
The President pro tempore of the Senate was 
not selected in the same manner as today. 
Today, the President pro tempore is an honor-
ific position held by the longest serving Senator 
of the majority party.  In the nineteenth cen-
tury, the President pro tempore was as the lit-
eral meaning of the title, “President for a time” 
suggests, elected by the Senate to preside over 
the body when the Vice President, who also 
serves as president of the Senate, did not. 
This meant that sometimes there was no presi-
dent pro tempore and that no elected president 
pro tempore would carry over to the next 
Congress.  Today, the Senate considers itself a 
continuing body because terms of Senators are 
staggered and roughly two-thirds of its mem-
bership continues in office at the end of each 
two year election cycle.  (The House, by con-
trast, ends after two years, and begins anew 
with the next Congress.)  
19 See appendix V
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Prior to the 20th Amendment, Congress was not 
in session frequently.  The original Constitution 
called for the Congress to convene in December, 
after the President had been inaugurated in 
March.  A new president might call the Senate 
into session briefly to confirm cabinet nomina-
tions, but the Vice President would likely pre-
side over that session. It was common for long 
periods of time to pass during which there 
would be no president pro tempore and often-
times the President pro tempore from one term 
would not serve in that capacity for the next 
term.  After the assassination of President 
Garfield, there were significant periods when 
his successor, Chester A. Arthur, served with no 
one in line to succeed him.  Consequently, in 
the 1880s, Congress changed the act because of 
the unstable potential for a change in party of 
the President, and for constitutional reasons.
Several incidents point out how close the United 
States came to invoking the Presidential 
Succession Act.  James Madison served as 
president at a time of great uncertainty – during 
the War of 1812 when our country was invaded 
by the British and Washington burned – and in 
both of his terms Madison’s vice presidents died 
in office.
The first president to die in office was William 
Henry Harrison, only thirty days into his term. 
John Tyler acted as president for three years 
without a vice president.  Tyler himself was 
nearly killed on a boat on the Potomac.  An 
explosion killed members of his cabinet – 
Secretary of the Navy, Thomas Gilmer, and 
Secretary of State, Abel P. Upshur.
Lincoln’s assassination left Andrew Johnson in 
the presidency.  Johnson was a Democrat, who 
had run with Lincoln on a unity ticket.  Lincoln’s 
death occurred only forty-two days into his 
second term, so Johnson would serve nearly 
four years.  Johnson’s presidency stirred up the 
Radical Republicans in Congress.   He was 
impeached by the House and the Senate fell one 
vote short of the two-thirds needed to remove 
him from office.  The Presidential succession 
system’s flaws were evident in this instance.  In 
the Senate, the President pro tempore was 
Republican Senator Ben Wade, who voted for 
Johnson’s removal.  Had one more Senator 
voted to remove Johnson, Wade would have not 
only voted for Johnson’s removal, but he would 
have effectively voted to make himself presi-
dent.20
Only eight years after the failed Johnson removal, 
the United States had perhaps its most disputed 
election.  The 1876 election was the 2000 
Florida election of its era, but it was more con-
tentious and not decided until just before the 
inauguration.  Ultimately, an election commis-
sion was appointed that gave all of the disputed 
electors to Rutherford B. Hayes giving him a 
majority of the Electoral College.  The final out-
come of the election was determined only two 
days before inauguration day.  Had Democrats 
been able to delay the counting of the votes for 
two more days, there would have been no presi-
dent-elect or vice president-elect to take office 
on inauguration day, and there would have been 
vacancies in the offices of President and Vice 
President.  In that case, the President pro tem-
pore of the Senate would have taken office, but 
there would be no president pro tempore for 
months to come as the Congress would not have 
20 40th Congress 2nd Session Supplement Cong. Globe 410-415 
(1868). Proceedings of the Senate Sitting for the Trial of Andrew 
Johnson; See appendix II
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met until December.  There might truly have 
been no president for a long period of time.
In 1880, James Garfield was elected president. 
The Republicans had been split into factions of 
“Stalwarts” and “Half-breeds.”  Garfield was a 
“Half-breed,” but he selected the “Stalwart” 
Chester Arthur as his running mate to mend 
party differences.  In September of 1881, after 
only six months in office, Garfield was shot in 
Buffalo by a disgruntled office seeker.  The 
assassin yelled, “I did it and will go to jail for it. 
I am a Stalwart, and Arthur will be President.”21 
After the shooting, Garfield was severely 
wounded, but lived for eighty days.  For most of 
that time he was unable to exercise the duties of 
President, although for a short period of time, he 
did perform some minor official acts.  At no time 
did Vice President Arthur consider taking over 
the presidency because of Garfield’s inability.
The 25th Amendment, ratified in 1967, pro-
vides clear procedures as to how a vice presi-
dent might take over and how the reins of power 
might be returned to a recovered president.22 
The constitutional language of Article II clearly 
allows for a temporary takeover of the presi-
dency, but neither it, nor any of the Presidential 
Succession Acts that we have had, provide any 
guidance on how it might happen.  There were 
some who mistakenly argued that a president 
who was incapacitated would never recover his 
office if the Vice President took over.  Eventually 
Garfield died and Arthur took over as president. 
But at that time, there was no president pro 
tempore of the Senate or Speaker of the House. 
21 Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential 
Succession. Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. Page 118 and 
The New York Times, July 3, 1881
22 Amendment XXV, United States Constitution; See appendix I
Arthur recognized this situation and called 
Congress into session a few weeks later so it 
could elect leaders to fill the line of succession. 
Nevertheless, there were several weeks during 
which the line of succession remained empty. 
And later scholarship has shown that Arthur 
was a sick man.  He suffered from Bright’s dis-
ease and died at the age of fifty-six only one and 
a half years after leaving the presidency.23
A similar situation arose four years later during 
the first administration of Grover Cleveland. 
Cleveland’s Vice President died and Congress 
had not yet elected a president pro tempore or a 
Speaker of the House.  Again, there was no one 
in the line of succession.
The Second Presidential 
Succession Act (1886-1947)
In 1886, Congress, shaken by recent instances 
when the line of succession seemed less than 
adequate, debated a new Presidential Succession 
Act.  The main reasons cited for a change were: 
(1) the constitutional objection – raised by 
Madison – that only those who hold office in the 
executive branch could be in the line of succes-
sion and (2) the “party change” argument. 
Leaders of Congress could be of a different 
party than the President.  This was the era of 
party parity, not unlike our own.  From 1876 to 
1892, no president was elected with a majority 
of the popular vote.  In Congress, each chamber 
switched hands several times, and there were 
several instances where congressional leaders 
were of the opposite party of the President; (3) 
23 Feerick, John D. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History 
and Applications. Fordham University Press, New York, 1992, Pages 
10-11
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the realization that there might not be anyone in 
the line of succession at a given time.
Ultimately, the Congress decided to take con-
gressional leaders out of the line of succession 
altogether and instead to rely solely on cabinet 
succession.  The 1886 Presidential Succession 
Act turned the presidency over to cabinet mem-
bers in the order of the creation of their respec-
tive departments, which were Secretary of State, 
Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of War, Attorney-
General, Postmaster-General, Secretary of the 
Navy, and Secretary of the Interior.
The law included several other minor provi-
sions.  The 1886 Act did not require a special 
election when a statutory successor to the 
President takes office as did the first succession 
act.  It did, however, require the statutory 
President (the Secretary of State or lower cabi-
net official who takes over as president) to call 
Congress into session within twenty days so that 
Congress would have the opportunity to provide 
for a special election by law if it so chose.24
The switch to cabinet succession also stipu-
lated that a cabinet member would be eligible 
for the presidency only if he or she had been 
appointed by the President and confirmed by 
the Senate for the relevant position.  (In other 
words, no recess appointments or acting secre-
taries were in the line of succession).  The 
Cabinet member could also not be under 
impeachment by the House at the time of the 
vacancy.  And finally, the Cabinet member 
must meet the constitutional qualifications to 
be president (to be a naturally born citizen, to 
be thirty-five years of age and to have resided 
24 Presidential Succession Act of 1886; See appendix II
for fourteen years in the United States) to suc-
ceed to the presidency.
The Second Presidential Succession Act remained 
in effect for over eighty years, until 1947, during 
which there were several succession crises. Grover 
Cleveland had major surgery to remove his can-
cerous jaw and, unbeknownst to the country, was 
temporarily disabled.  William McKinley was 
shot, and Vice President Teddy Roosevelt took 
over.  (This was months after one pundit said that 
“there is only an assassin’s bullet between this 
madman and the presidency.”)
The most troubling succession crisis, however, 
was that of the extended disability of President 
Woodrow Wilson at the end of his second term. 
Wilson had a stroke in October of 1919.  For the 
remaining seventeen months of his term, he was 
hidden from view and, by most accounts, inca-
pacitated.  His wife and a close adviser effec-
tively ran the government, as they were the only 
ones who would “communicate” with Wilson and 
report back on his wishes.  Vice President 
Thomas Marshall clearly indicated that he would 
not challenge the capacity of the President.  And 
thus America existed for seventeen months with 
a presidency that was effectively vacant.25
In subsequent years, Warren Harding died in 
office, leaving Calvin Coolidge acting as presi-
dent.  A number of scholars believe that 
Coolidge was incapacitated for significant peri-
ods of his second term due to serious bouts of 
depression.26
25 Feerick, John D. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History 
and Applications. Fordham University Press, New York, 1992, Pages 
12-15
26 See Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential 
Succession. Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. Pages 184-189
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The 20th Amendment (1933)
In 1933, just before Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
first inauguration, the 20th Amendment was 
ratified.  The Amendment called for a new inau-
guration date and a new meeting date of 
Congress so that Congress would come into ses-
sion to count electoral votes before the inaugu-
ration.  The amendment also included two 
sections relating to Presidential succession.
Section 3 makes it clear that if the President-
elect dies prior to the inauguration, then the 
Vice President-elect will be sworn in as presi-
dent at the inauguration. It reads:
 Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the begin-
ning of the term of the President, the 
President elect shall have died, the Vice 
President elect shall become President. If a 
President shall not have been chosen before 
the time fixed for the beginning of his term, 
or if the President elect shall have failed to 
qualify, then the Vice President elect shall 
act as President until a President shall have 
qualified; and the Congress may by law pro-
vide for the case wherein neither a President 
elect nor a Vice President elect shall have 
qualified, declaring who shall then act as 
President, or the manner in which one who 
is to act shall be selected, and such person 
shall act accordingly until a President or 
Vice President shall have qualified.
Section 3 also stipulates that Congress might 
specify who will succeed to the presidency if 
the President-elect and the Vice President-
elect shall not have qualified for office.  This 
allows Congress to provide for scenarios whereby 
an election dispute prevents the election of 
either a president or vice president; the 
President-elect and Vice President-elect are 
killed before inauguration day; or, the more 
unlikely case, if both have some other disquali-
fying reason such as they are not yet thirty-five 
years old.  In the Third Presidential Succession 
Act (1947), Congress added the case of 
“failure to qualify” as a possible condition for 
Presidential succession.
Section 4 of the 20th Amendment reads:
 The Congress may by law provide for the 
case of the death of any of the persons from 
whom the House of Representatives may 
choose a President whenever the right of 
choice shall have devolved upon them, and 
for the case of the death of any of the per-
sons from whom the Senate may choose a 
Vice President whenever the right of choice 
shall have devolved upon them.
Section 4 allows Congress to provide for the 
special case where Congress must select the 
President because no one has received a major-
ity of the Electoral College.27  Even though 
authorized to do so by the Amendment, Congress 
has never passed legislation to deal with such a 
scenario.
In an eerie coincidence, just days after the 
ratification of this amendment, President-elect 
Roosevelt was riding in a car in Miami with the 
Mayor of Chicago and others.  An assassin shot 
at the car, killing the Mayor.  Roosevelt was 
unhurt.28  Had Roosevelt been killed, the 20th 
Amendment clarified that Vice President-elect 
27 Amendment XX, United States Constitution; See appendix I
28 See Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential 
Succession. Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. Page 190
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John Nance Garner would have become 
president. 
Third Presidential Succession 
Act (1947-present)
It is well known that Roosevelt was unable to 
walk unassisted after an attack of polio.  This 
condition, however, did not limit him from vigor-
ously carrying out the duties of the presidency. 
Towards the end of his presidency, however, 
Roosevelt was a very sick man, and there is dis-
pute among scholars as to whether he was 
impaired in his judgments at Yalta and in the 
final months before his death.29
Roosevelt’s death elevated Harry Truman to the 
presidency.  Truman had served as vice presi-
dent for only a few months when he became 
president, and he and Roosevelt were not close. 
It was only upon Roosevelt’s death that Truman 
was informed of America’s project to build an 
atomic weapon.30
Truman became vice president and then presi-
dent after a long career in Congress.  Shortly, 
after assuming the presidency, he gave a speech 
proposing changes to the Presidential Succession 
Act.  He argued that congressional leaders 
should be higher than the cabinet in the line of 
succession because they are elected rather than 
appointed by the President and that a president 
should not appoint his own successor.31
29  Feerick, John D. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete 
History and Applications. Fordham University Press, New York, 1992, 
Pages 15-17
30  See Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presiden-
tial Succession. Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. Page 199 
31  Special Message to the Congress on the Succession to the Presi-
dency, June 19, 1945; See appendix III
The 79th Congress considered the matter, but 
there was opposition.  When Republicans 
gained control in the 80th Congress, the Truman 
proposal gained favor.  Truman still stood by a 
plan that would give the presidency to the other 
party if the President had been killed (there was 
at this time no vice president as Truman had 
become president and there was not yet a 
mechanism for appointing a new vice 
president.)32
Truman’s proposal was for the Speaker of the 
House and then the President pro tempore of the 
Senate to be followed by the cabinet in the line 
of succession.  He also favored a special elec-
tion for president if the vacancy in the presi-
dency and vice presidency occurred early in 
the term.33
Ultimately, most of Truman’s proposal—but not 
the provision for a special election—was 
adopted in the Presidential Succession Act of 
1947.  This act, still in force today, establishes 
that, after the Vice President, the presidency 
will pass to the Speaker of the House, the 
President pro tempore of the Senate, and finally 
to the heads of Cabinet departments in their 
order of creation.34
The 1886 Presidential Succession Act similarly 
extended the presidency to Cabinet officers in 
the order of the creation of their departments. 
However, the 1886 Act was not updated to 
reflect the creation of new departments.  The 
1947 Presidential Succession Act included the 
32 See Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential 
Succession. Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. Pages 208-
209
33 Special Message to the Congress on the Succession to the 
Presidency, June 19, 1945; See appendix III
34   Presidential Succession Act of 1947; See appendix II
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heads of cabinet departments that had been 
added since 1886.  Subsequently, there has 
been a tradition of amending the Act each time 
that a new department is created to add the 
head of that department to the end of the line of 
succession.  These small amendments to the 
1947 Act are the only changes that have been 
made to it since its passage.
Bumping Procedures
In addition to preferring congressional leaders to 
cabinet members, Truman not only advocated 
that these leaders be placed above cabinet mem-
bers in the line of succession, but also that newly 
elected congressional leaders be eligible to 
bump cabinet members from the presidency.
The Act makes it clear that a president or vice 
president who recovers from a disability or 
qualifies for office (say a president elected after 
a long election dispute with a Speaker of the 
House serving as president for a time) may 
“bump” out a congressional leader or cabinet 
member who is acting as president.
But the Act also provides for the case where a 
cabinet member acts as president because the 
congressional leaders are dead or unable to 
serve.  Newly elected congressional leaders 
may bump cabinet members who are serving 
as president.  For example, if the President, 
Vice President, Speaker, and President pro 
tempore are killed, the Secretary of State would 
act as president.  But the Presidential 
Succession Act of 1947 provides that if the 
House of Representatives were to elect a new 
Speaker or the Senate a new president pro 
tempore, then one of those congressional lead-
ers could bump the Secretary of State and 
become president.
There is no provision for bumping a cabinet 
member by another cabinet member, so if the 
Secretary of Defense becomes President, a 
newly appointed Secretary of State may not 
bump him.  Also, there is no provision for a new 
Speaker to bump the President pro tempore.35
The bumping procedure is controversial.  A 
number of constitutional scholars believe it is 
unconstitutional and others argue that it is an 
unwise policy.36  As for its constitutionality, 
the scholars point out that the Constitution 
allows Congress to write a succession act 
“declaring what Officer shall then act as 
president, and such Officer shall act accord-
ingly, until the Disability be removed, or a 
President shall be elected” (emphasis added).37 
Under the key constitutional provision, once 
selected to act as president, the officer will 
continue to act until the President’s disability 
is removed, or, in the case of death or con-
tinuing disability, until a presidential elec-
tion (either the next general election or a 
special election for president).  The 
Constitution on its face seems to stipulate 
that once a person is deemed to be acting 
president by the Presidential Succession Act, 
he or she cannot be replaced by a different 
person. This interpretation makes some logi-
cal sense as the provision would presumably 
prevent the confusion that would arise if the 
presidency were transferred to several differ-
35  Ibid
36  See Amar, Akhil Reed and Amar, Vikram David. “Is the Presidential 
Succession Law Constitutional?” 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1995-1996 and 
Fortier, John C. and Ornstein, Norman J. “Presidential Succession and 
Presidential Leaders,” Catholic University Law Review, Fall 2004
37  Article II, Section 1, United States Constitution; See appendix I
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ent individuals in a short period of time. It 
would also seemingly prevent Congress from 
exercising influence on the executive branch 
by threatening to replace a cabinet member 
acting as president with a newly elected 
Speaker of the House.
Additional Minor Provisions of 
the Current Presidential 
Succession Act
Several other minor provisions of the Presidential 
succession act are worth noting.
? Speaker of the House or president pro tem-
pore of the Senate must resign from his or 
her office and from Congress in order to act 
as president.  This applies not only in the 
case of the death of a president, but also in 
the case of a short term incapacitation.  The 
Constitution requires that congressional 
leaders step down from their posts in order 
to assume any office in the executive 
branch.  The Presidential Succession Act 
reiterates this requirement. After acting as 
president, they cannot go back to their old 
congressional posts.
? Similarly, a cabinet member, in order to 
assume the presidency, must resign from 
office.  This is not required by the 
Constitution, only by the statute.  Under 
the Constitution, a member of the execu-
tive branch can hold two offices; a 
Secretary of State could also hold the 
office of Vice President.  But the statute 
expressly requires a resignation by the 
Cabinet member.
? Any person in the line of succession must 
meet the constitutional eligibility require-
ments for president (e.g., natural born citi-
zenship) to assume the presidency.
? Cabinet members in the line of succession 
must have been confirmed by the Senate. 
This means that recess appointees who 
head cabinet departments are not eligible 
to serve as president.  The language in the 
current Presidential Succession Act is 
less clear than that of the 1886 Act with 
respect to Senate confirmation.  The 1886 
Act refers to “such officers as shall have 
been appointed by the advice and consent 
of the Senate to the officer therein named…
.”38  The current act merely refers to “offi-
cers appointed, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.”39  Read liter-
ally, this means that the current act allows 
for acting secretaries to be in the line of 
succession as long as they are confirmed 
by the Senate for a post (even for example, 
the second or third in command within a 
department).  It is not uncommon for a 
second in command to become acting sec-
retary when the secretary leaves office. 
Though there is some dispute over this 
provision, the language clearly permits 
acting secretaries to be placed in the line 
of succession. (We have spoken to acting 
secretaries who told us they had been 
placed in the line of succession.)
? No cabinet member under impeachment of 
the House of Representatives could serve 
as president.
38  Presidential Succession Act of 1886; See appendix II
39  Presidential Succession Act of 1947; See appendix II
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Eisenhower’s Illnesses, the 
Kennedy Assassination and the 
25th Amendment
After the passage of the 1947 Succession Act, 
Eisenhower’s illnesses and President Kennedy’s 
assassination spurred the enactment of the 25th 
Amendment, which deals primarily with presi-
dential incapacitation.
President Eisenhower’s several serious illnesses 
sparked a renewed interest in the question of 
presidential disability and succession.  In par-
ticular, after a heart attack, Eisenhower drafted a 
memorandum of understanding laying out in 
significant detail how Vice President Nixon 
should act, how power might be transferred to the 
Vice President and back to the President.40  This 
practice of issuing such memos was continued 
under the Kennedy and Johnson presidency and 
had some effect on the language of the 25th 
Amendment, which was ratified in 1967, and 
which provided for Presidential succession.
Congress wrestled with the issue of a constitu-
tional amendment for presidential incapacitation 
in the early 1960s.  In particular, the issue 
became a serious one for Senator Estes Kefauver, 
and later Senator Birch Bayh, who chaired the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, a division of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee which had con-
stitutional amendments in its jurisdiction.  The 
assassination of President Kennedy hastened 
work on the Amendment.  In the immediate 
aftermath of Kennedy’s assassination, there were 
rumors that Vice President Johnson had been 
killed or had suffered a heart attack.  The death 
40  Feerick, John D. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History 
and Applications. Fordham University Press, New York, 1992, Page 53
of Kennedy highlighted the problem that there 
was no way to appoint a new vice president in the 
case of the death of the President.  And with 
Johnson’s prior heart difficulties and Eisenhower’s 
illnesses, the issue of how a president might 
transfer power in the case of an incapacitation 
was rightly understood as significant.41
Ultimately, after several attempts, Congress 
passed and the states ratified the 25th 
Amendment.  It reads:
Section 1. In case of the removal of the 
President from office or of his death or res-
ignation, the Vice President shall become 
President. 
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in 
the office of the Vice President, the President 
shall nominate a Vice President who shall 
take office upon confirmation by a majority 
vote of both Houses of Congress. 
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits 
to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives his written declaration that 
he is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office, and until he transmits to 
them a written declaration to the contrary, 
such powers and duties shall be discharged 
by the Vice President as Acting President.
 
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and 
a majority of either the principal officers of 
the executive departments or of such other 
body as Congress may by law provide, 
41 Feerick, John D. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History 
and Applications. Fordham University Press, New York, 1992, Pages 
10-11
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transmit to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives their written declaration 
that the President is unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office, the Vice 
President shall immediately assume the 
powers and duties of the office as Acting 
President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives his 
written declaration that no inability exists, he 
shall resume the powers and duties of his office 
unless the Vice President and a majority of 
either the principal officers of the executive 
department or of such other body as Congress 
may by law provide, transmit within four days 
to the President pro tempore of the Senate and 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
their written declaration that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide 
the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours 
for that purpose if not in session. If the 
Congress within twenty-one days after receipt 
of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress 
is not in session within twenty-one days after 
Congress is required to assemble, determines 
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office, the Vice President 
shall continue to discharge the same as Acting 
President; otherwise, the President shall 
resume the powers and duties of his office.42 
In a nutshell, the 25th Amendment achieves 
two major objectives:  First, it provides a mech-
42  Amendment XXV, United States Constitution; See appendix I
anism for appointing a vice president if the 
office is vacant.  Second, it clarifies and pro-
vides specific procedures for the transfer of 
power relating to presidential incapacity.
The vacant vice presidency had been a major 
problem prior to 1967.  Eight presidents and 
seven vice presidents died in office, in each case 
leaving a vacancy in the vice presidency.  In the 
178 years under the Constitution before the 25th 
Amendment was ratified, we had more than 37 
years without a vice president.43  Though the 
United States would have faced problems of 
Presidential succession had something happened 
to the President, during all of those years without 
vice presidents, the Presidents did not die, and 
the successors listed in the Presidential 
Succession Act were therefore not needed.  
However, Congress saw that the United States 
might not always be so fortunate in the future. 
The 25th Amendment was for the President to 
appoint a new vice president, and for the Senate 
and the House of Representatives to confirm 
the selection.  It is the only office that requires 
the confirmation of both Houses of Congress.
In the debate over the 25th Amendment, some 
proponents believed that there should be a time-
frame for the appointment and confirmation.  Six 
weeks from the date of the vacancy was com-
monly suggested as an appropriate amount of 
time to appoint and confirm a replacement.  In 
the end, the authors did not include such a time-
frame in the amendment, though many agreed 
that six weeks was reasonable, given the need for 
a robust line of succession.44
43 See appendix VII
44   Feerick, John D. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History and 
Applications. Fordham University Press, New York, 1992, Page 68-70
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The vice presidential replacement provision 
was used twice shortly after the ratification of 
the Amendment.  Richard Nixon nominated 
Gerald Ford for vice president when Spiro 
Agnew stepped aside.  Not long after, when 
Richard Nixon resigned, Gerald Ford appointed 
Nelson Rockefeller to the vice presidency.  In 
both cases the appointment and confirmation 
process took longer than the presumed six 
weeks – seven and a half weeks for Ford and 
more than four months for Rockefeller.
While this provision has not been used since 
the early 1970s, its initial use circumvented a 
problem the framers of the Amendment feared. 
Were it not for the 25th Amendment, when 
Agnew resigned the Democratic Congress 
could have been in a difficult position had 
they proceeded with the impeachment and 
removal of Richard Nixon.  Carl Albert, the 
Speaker of the House, would have known that 
by voting to impeach Republican President 
Nixon he would also be voting to install him-
self, a Democrat, in the presidency. In fact, 
there were a few Democratic members of 
Congress who urged Albert not to confirm 
Gerald Ford so the Democrats could take the 
presidency after a Nixon impeachment.  Albert 
declined to pursue this course of action, and 
Gerald Ford was confirmed and would soon 
succeed to the presidency.
The second issue addressed by the 25th 
Amendment is clarification of how the presi-
dency is temporarily passed to the Vice 
President in cases of presidential incapacita-
tion and how it is transferred back to a recov-
ered president.  The language of the original 
Constitution is clear when it provides that 
such a temporary transfer of power can occur. 
Article II section 1 contemplates that the Vice 
President shall act as president in the case of 
the President’s “Inability to discharge the 
Powers and Duties of the said Office.”  And 
Congress may provide by law when such an 
“Inability” occurs and the Vice President 
cannot act.  When Congress acts, the succes-
sor can act as president “until the disability be 
removed.”45
Despite the Constitution’s relatively clear lan-
guage, some believe that a vice president who 
stepped in for an incapacitated president would 
not return the power to the President upon the 
removal of disability.  Some believe that this 
contributed to the reluctance of presidents and 
vice presidents to transfer power for disability. 
Take for example, the cases of Vice President 
Marshall during Woodrow Wilson’s incapacity 
and Chester Arthur during Garfield’s.46  
Sections 3 and 4 of the 25th Amendment 
describe the transfer of power.  Section 3 is the 
most straightforward.  A president may indicate 
inability in a written statement transmitted to 
both Houses of Congress.  Upon this written 
statement, the Vice President becomes the 
Acting President.  The President can then 
reclaim presidential authority by issuing another 
written statement to Congress explaining that 
his inability to perform the duties of the 
President has been removed.47
The circumstances under which section 3 might 
be invoked have arisen a number of times since 
the ratification of the 25th Amendment.  Most 
45   Article II, Section 1, United States Constitution; See appendix I
46  See Neustadt, Richard E. “The Twenty-Fifth Amendment and Its 
Achilles Heel,” 30 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1995, Pages 430-432
47 Amendment XXV; See appendix I
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commonly, this scenario arises when a presi-
dent undergoes medical procedures that require 
general anesthesia.  Interestingly, there was 
some reluctance on the part of several presi-
dents to directly invoke section 3 of the 25th 
Amendment, although there was a written dec-
laration of inability.  The formal invocation of 
section 3, however, did occur in 2002 as George 
W. Bush underwent a colonoscopy.
Section 4, which provides for the difficult situa-
tion in which the Vice President doubts whether 
the President is able to carry out his duties, has 
never been invoked.  Hypothetically, such situa-
tions could be divided into two categories.  In 
one case, the Vice President, with the agreement 
of a majority of the cabinet, declares the President 
to be incapacitated, and the Vice President steps 
in to act as president.  This might occur if a 
president were to have a sudden stroke, making 
him unable to transfer power on his own.  The 
second, more contentious case would be a situa-
tion in which the Vice President and a majority 
of the cabinet believe that the President is inca-
pacitated, but the President disagrees.  In this 
case, Congress may have to resolve the issue, 
with a two thirds vote of both houses required to 
declare the President unable to perform his 
duties and to install the Vice President as presi-
dent for the duration of the disability.  The most 
likely scenario that would lead to such a proce-
dure would be mental illness in the President.
Sections 3 and 4 of the 25th Amendment pro-
vide much more guidance than the original 
Constitution as to the specifics of the transfer of 
power relating to presidential incapacity.  There 
are, however, two areas not covered that might 
arise, especially in the case of a catastrophic 
attack on our institutions.  
First, if there were to be a temporary vacancy in 
the Vice Presidency or if a catastrophic attack 
were to create many holes in the line of succes-
sion, the process of transfer of power would 
encounter additional difficulties. The 25th 
Amendment only deals with the case of the trans-
fer of power between the President and the Vice 
President. In cases where the Speaker and 
President pro tempore became acting president, it 
would not be possible to easily transfer power 
back and forth with the original President.  As 
members of Congress, these figures would have 
to resign their congressional seats in order to 
serve as president, even on a temporary basis. 
They would not be able to go back to their posi-
tions after a president recovered.  Cabinet mem-
bers lower in the line of succession would face 
the same problem, not because the Constitution 
requires that they leave their posts to become 
president, but because the Presidential 
Succession Act does.  Further, neither congres-
sional leaders nor cabinet members in the line of 
succession could invoke the procedure that 
requires the assent of the majority of the cabinet 
to declare the President incapacitated.
A second problem under section 4 arises if a 
catastrophic attack decimates the cabinet.  Then 
no majority of a cabinet could be assembled to 
assent to the Vice President’s declaration that 
the President is incapacitated.
It should be noted that the original Constitution 
does allow for the transfer of power in the case of 
inability, so a transfer might be made, but without 
the specific procedures of the 25th Amendment. 
Also, the Succession Act itself could be amended 
to spell out procedures for figures in the line of 
succession other than the Vice President to take 
over from the President in the case of inability.
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1.  All the Figures in the Line of Succession 
Live and Work in Washington, D.C.
The line of succession was built primarily to 
deal with the death of a president, not a cata-
strophic attack on Washington. As such, with 
the possibility of nuclear, biological or chemical 
terrorist attacks, the whole line of succession 
may become vulnerable.  While precautions are 
often taken to ensure that the President, Vice 
President and other members of the line of suc-
cession are not in the same place at the same 
time, most of the figures in the line of succes-
sion attend certain ceremonial occasions such 
as the State of the Union and the Inauguration.
2. Congressional Leaders in the Line of 
Succession
There are serious policy and constitutional 
objections to having Congressional leaders in 
the line of succession.  The Constitution allows 
Congress to specify which “Officers”48 shall be 
in the line of succession, a term that almost 
certainly refers to executive branch officials. 
More broadly, there are structural consider-
ations that make it difficult for Congressional 
48  Article II, Section 1, United States Constitution; See appendix I
leaders to assume a position in the executive 
branch.  Congressional leaders cannot easily 
step in for an incapacitated president, and they 
may have conflicts of interest in an impeach-
ment and removal scenario.
On policy grounds, Congressional leaders may 
be of the opposite party as the President.  A 
political zealot might seek to change the party 
in the executive branch with a single attack.  A 
freak accident might lead to a sudden change in 
party; the death of President Reagan and Vice 
President Bush could have led to President Tip 
O’Neill.  The death of President Clinton and 
Vice President Gore might have led to President 
Newt Gingrich.  The situation becomes  more 
tenuous if the vice presidency has been vacant 
for a time.  Finally, in a catastrophic attack, the 
presidency could shift between branches and 
between parties, causing the makeup of the 
legislative and executive branches to change 
virtually overnight.
In addition, the so-called “bumping procedure” 
allowing congressional leaders elected after an 
attack to bump out a cabinet member who is 
serving as president is especially troublesome. 
As a result, the nation could potentially have 
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multiple presidents in a short period of time. 
And the problem of a party shift would only be 
magnified if the new Congressional leaders are 
of a different party than before the attack, and 
these leaders might be of a different party than 
the President.
In addition, the bumping procedure could allow 
Congress to have undue sway over the executive 
after an attack.  For example, if the Secretary of 
State were to become president, Congress could 
threaten to replace him with its own leaders 
unless he complies with Congress’s demands. 
This would essentially eviscerate the separation 
of powers.
3. The Order of Succession
The line of succession has a certain order to it, 
with the Cabinet officials from the oldest depart-
ments earlier in the line of succession, at least 
after Congressional leaders.  But for years we 
have simply relied on this formula without criti-
cally analyzing the logic behind the order 
itself.
First, it makes little sense to include the 
President pro tempore of the Senate in the line 
of succession.  While many figures in this posi-
tion have been highly able, the criterion for 
selecting the President pro tempore (the longest 
serving senator in the majority party) ensures 
that he will be of considerable age (ninety-eight 
-year-old Strom Thurmond held the post in 
2001).  Aside from the age issue, the President 
pro tempore might not truly represent his or her 
party nor reflect the views of the majority of the 
Senate.  The Majority Leader would be more 
comparable to the Speaker of the House 
(although there are some difficulties in defining 
this non-Constitutional figure) in the succession 
statute. Alternatively, the position of President 
pro tempore could be awarded on different crite-
ria which would reflect the reality that this 
person is three heartbeats from the presidency.
As for the cabinet, the Secretary heads of cabi-
net departments lower in the line of succession 
are often picked with an eye towards special 
knowledge of their departments’ policy areas, 
such as agriculture or veterans affairs, or to fill 
geographical, ideological or other criteria, but 
not with the thought in mind that they could 
become president.
Finally, even with respect to the heads of the 
Big Four – the departments of State, Treasury, 
Defense and the Attorney General, there is a 
legitimate question as to what order should pre-
vail in the line of succession.  Should the 
Secretary of the Treasury come before the 
Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General? 
Which secretary would be the most capable of 
leading our nation in the face of a catastrophic 
attack? 
4. Acting Secretaries in the Line of Succession
The language of the current Presidential 
Succession Act allows an acting head of a 
department to be in the line of succession if that 
person has been confirmed by the Senate for any 
post whatsoever, not just for head of the depart-
ment.49  In ordinary times, this might lead to 
confusion in the line of succession.  Would the 
acting Secretary of State really be ahead of the 
original Treasury and Defense Secretaries in the 
line of succession?  In the case of a catastrophic 
49  Presidential Succession Act of 1947; See appendix II
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attack, this provision might cause even greater 
confusion as departments have their own internal 
lines of succession, and the death of the head of 
a department might result in the automatic 
ascension of an acting secretary.  The acting 
secretary might then claim to be in the line of 
succession ahead of cabinet officers from other 
departments lower in the overall Presidential 
succession provisions.
Finally, the confusion over the status of acting 
secretaries as opposed to original secretaries 
would inevitably become an issue should an 
attack take place around a presidential inaugu-
ration.  Traditionally, heads of departments 
resign just in advance of the inauguration of the 
incoming President, leaving their department in 
the hands of an acting secretary.  In this case, 
an attack around the inauguration would leave 
the acting secretaries of the outgoing adminis-
tration in place as the successors for the incom-
ing President.
5. Incapacitation
The 25th Amendment covers many details of 
how an incapacitated president transfers power 
to a vice president.  The amendment does not, 
however, cover the case of a transfer of power 
from an incapacitated president to other figures 
in the line of succession if the Vice President is 
not able to act.  Though the Constitution gives 
Congress the authority to enact legislation deal-
ing with  these circumstances, Congress has not 
chosen to do so.  The lack of guidelines  could 
lead to great uncertainty if a catastrophic attack 
were to leave several figures in the line of suc-
cession dead or incapacitated.
The provision in the Presidential Succession 
Act requiring cabinet members to resign their 
posts to assume the presidency creates similar 
problems.  Congressional leaders in the line 
must resign because the Constitution does not 
allow individuals to hold posts in the legislative 
and executive branches simultaneously. There 
is, however, no constitutional reason for cabinet 
members to resign; the requirement is purely 
statutory.  In the case of an incapacitated presi-
dent with a cabinet member next in the line of 
succession, the Cabinet member might take 
over for the President temporarily, but then 
would lose his or her post when the President 
recovers.  If the President were to slip back into 
an incapacitated state, cabinet members who 
had already assumed the presidency would no 
longer be eligible to take over again because 
they would have resigned their cabinet posi-
tions and thus removed themselves from the 
line of succession.  This requirement leads to 
unnecessary confusion with an incapacitated 
president.50
6. The Inauguration and Pre-inauguration 
Scenarios.
Perhaps the most dangerous time for Presidential 
succession is the inauguration of a new presi-
dent, when the outgoing line of succession is 
gathered together and the incoming line is not 
yet in place.  
Consider that both the outgoing and incoming 
presidents and vice presidents attend the cere-
mony along with the Speaker of the House and 
the President pro tempore of the Senate, pro-
posed and announced, but not yet nominated 
cabinet members of the new President and most 
50  Fortier, John and Ornstein, Norman. “Presidential Succession and 
Presidential Leaders,” Catholic University Law Review (Fall 2004).
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members of Congress.  On January 20th at 
noon, the outgoing President and Vice 
President’s terms end.  They cannot constitu-
tionally stay on past that date.  The incoming 
President and Vice President will assume office 
at noon. The Speaker and the President pro 
tempore will have already assumed their posi-
tions when Congress convened on January 3rd. 
The cabinet members’ terms do not end when 
the term of the President ends, but  almost all 
cabinet members resign shortly before the 
administration ends.  Acting secretaries are left 
in charge of the departments, and if they had 
been confirmed by the  Senate to fill lower level 
positions earlier, might be considered part of 
the line of succession in their current capacities 
as acting secretaries.
The cabinet members of the new administration 
are typically selected before the inauguration—
but not confirmed until afterward. By January 
20th, the Senate will have held and completed 
hearings for most of them.  And all but one or two 
controversial picks will likely be ready for an 
immediate vote on the Senate floor as soon as the 
new President takes office, officially sends their 
appointments to the Senate, and the Senate 
reconvenes and confirms them.  This process can 
be completed expeditiously, but even in the best 
case scenario it still takes several hours.  It is not 
until late in the afternoon that the new President 
has any of his cabinet confirmed.  In 1989, the 
Senate did not meet to consider nominations 
until six days after the inauguration.  So for a 
period of hours and perhaps days, the new 
President has none of his or her own cabinet 
members in the line of succession.  
If an attack were to occur at the inauguration 
killing the incoming President, Vice President, 
Speaker and the President pro tempore, the 
country would be left in an undesirable situa-
tion. Those who remained in the line of 
Presidential succession would be the usually 
inexperienced acting cabinet members, rather 
than than the previous administration’s cabi-
net secretaries who would have likely resigned 
on the evening of January 19th or early morn-
ing on January 20th. Alternatively, a handful 
of surviving members of Congress could con-
vene, choose a new Speaker, and have that 
individual become president for the full four 
year term remaining.
Depending on the time period during which the 
dilemma occurred, the resolution would be left 
to a different entity: the electors, Congress, or 
the Presidential Succession Act. There are 
three periods of time to consider: (1) the period 
of time from Election Day until the Presidential 
electors cast their vote in December; (2) the 
period of time from the day that the Presidential 
electors cast their votes until the electors are 
counted; (3) the period of time between the 
counting of the electoral votes and the inaugu-
ration. 
Resolution during the third period is the most 
straightforward as the President and Vice 
President would already have been elected. 
The 20th Amendment clarifies that if the 
president-elect dies, then the Vice President 
elect will become President on January 20th.51 
If both the President-elect and the Vice 
President-elect die before inauguration day, 
then the Presidential Succession Act would 
kick in, and the Speaker of the House would 
become president.
51  Amendment XX, United States Constitution; See appendix I
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The first and second periods are more difficult to 
address because arguably there is no president-
elect.  In both the first and second periods, the 
electoral votes have not been certified. There is 
an official president-elect only when Congress 
counts and certifies the electoral votes. 
In the first period, if the President-elect dies 
before the electors vote, the matter would likely 
fall into the hands of the winning political party. 
The Presidential electors tend to be obscure but 
loyal partisans appointed as rewards for their 
service to the political party.  If the President-
elect were to die, the political party would 
likely instruct its electors to vote for the Vice 
President-elect.  Alternatively, the electors 
could vote for the deceased President-elect – 
and hope that Congress would count the votes 
and declare the deceased President-elect to be 
the winner with the Vice President-elect suc-
ceeding to the presidency.  However, there is a 
possibility that Congress would not count votes 
cast for a deceased candidate, and the presi-
dency could then end up in the hands of the 
other party that had actually lost the election. 
If both the President-elect and the Vice 
President-elect were to die before the electors 
cast their votes, the political parties would 
likely have to instruct their electors to cast 
their votes for a new candidate.  In this case, 
the Presidential electors would end up voting 
for someone who was not on the winning ticket 
in the November election.  While constitution-
ally legitimate, the country would face the 
unpalatable reality that the President would be 
someone who was not on the ballot and who 
was picked by party insiders on a moment’s 
notice.
The second period between the casting and 
counting of the electoral votes is the most con-
fusing.  The candidates are not yet formally the 
President-elect and Vice President-elect, 
because Congress could choose to challenge or 
discard votes or to find a result other than 
expected.  Yet since the electors have already 
voted, the electors cannot revote for a party-
determined replacement for the deceased 
President-elect.  Congress might be faced with 
a difficult choice. If it counts votes for the 
deceased candidates, then it might be effec-
tively electing its Speaker of the House to be 
president, as the Presidential Succession Act 
would kick in. Alternatively, if they chose not to 
count votes cast for the winning, but now 
deceased ticket, then the House would have to 
choose the new president, only choosing from 
the losing party candidates.
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1. The Presidential Line of Succession 
Should Extend Outside of Washington, D.C.
Given the possibility of an attack with weapons 
of mass destruction, it is essential that the line 
of Presidential succession include at least some 
individuals who live and work outside of the 
Washington, D.C. area.
There are several ways to achieve this objective. 
For instance, federal officials such as ambassa-
dors and governors, perhaps in the order of the 
size of their state or the creation of the states, 
could be included in the line of succession as a 
last resort. The Commission’s preferred solution, 
however, is to create four or five new federal 
offices.  The President would appoint important 
figures to these offices, and they would be con-
firmed by the Senate.  The Commission envisions 
these individuals would largely be former high 
government officials that the President felt com-
fortable appointing such as former presidents, 
former secretaries of state, former members of 
Congress, or even sitting governors all located 
outside of Washington, D.C. Though the 
Constitution prevents presidents from seeking 
third terms in office, former presidents are, 
indeed, eligible to be selected in the Presidential 
line of succession. Some states prohibit state 
officeholders from holding federal office, but 
other states allow it.  Sitting governors from the 
states that allow dual office-holding could also 
be considered by the President and the Senate. 
These new offices would sit at the end of the line 
of succession as a failsafe if a catastrophic attack 
on Washington wiped out others in the line of 
succession.  
The Commission also recommends that only the 
top four cabinet members be included in the 
line of succession [See recommendation 4], with 
the officers outside of Washington as last in the 
line of succession instead of the lower profile 
cabinet members under the current law.
It is important to keep these new officers informed 
of matters that would be relevant if they were 
suddenly thrust into the presidency following a 
catastrophic attack.  Lower profile cabinet mem-
bers are not as a matter of course briefed regu-
larly and thoroughly on national security matters. 
However, these newly created officers would 
presumably have high levels of past experience 
that would help them in the position of President. 
But in addition, the White House should strive to 
include these officers in regular (at least monthly) 
national security briefings, as a part of their 
duties as Officers of the United States.
Recommendations
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2. Remove Congressional Leaders from 
the Line of Succession
There is reason to believe that including con-
gressional leaders in the line of succession may 
be unconstitutional. If a Congressional leader 
not from the President’s party were to assume 
the presidency, it could lead to a destabilizing 
change of party for the federal government. 
Additionally, as outlined above, the inclusion of 
Congressional leaders could lead to multiple 
successors in a short period of time. American 
constitutional structure makes the most sense if 
Article I gives Congress the power to specify 
which executive branch figures should be in the 
line of succession.
Harry Truman felt that successors should be 
elected officials and that a president should 
not be able to appoint his own successors. 
While it is true that Congressional leaders are 
elected, they are elected only by their state or 
district. The election criterion, powerful as it 
is, is simply not compelling enough to out-
weigh the drawbacks, constitutional and other-
wise, from having congressional leaders in the 
line. For reasons of stability, it is preferable 
that a president select successors who are 
sympathetic to the party or standing agenda of 
the White House and that the selection not be 
made just by the President, but also with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.
Excluding Congressional leaders would elimi-
nate the possibility that the presidency would 
shift to the other party if a catastrophic attack 
killed both the President and Vice President. 
It would eliminate the possibility of a rump 
group of a handful of lawmakers choosing a 
Speaker of the House who would then become 
president. It would also eliminate the provi-
sion in the current law whereby a subsequently 
elected Speaker bumps out a cabinet member 
who has taken over for the President.  This 
provision could lead to three presidents in a 
short period of time.
Finally, the exclusion of Congressional leaders 
would improve succession during incapacita-
tion. If the presidency must pass to a 
Congressional leader because of a temporary 
incapacitation, then it would be very difficult 
for Congressional leaders to step in for the 
President.  Unless the Congressional leaders 
were willing to resign their congressional seats, 
they could not take over the presidency.  And 
once they resigned, they could not reclaim their 
seats unless they ran for the seat and won in the 
next scheduled election. 
The commission recognizes the political dif-
ficulty of removing Congressional leaders 
from the line of succession. Short of exclud-
ing the Congressional leaders altogether, 
four smaller steps might be taken.  First, 
Congress should remove the “bumping pro-
cedure,” by which a subsequent Speaker 
could claim the presidency from a cabinet 
successor.  Instead, the law should allow a 
living Speaker or Senate leader to take the 
presidency if the President and Vice President 
are killed, but if the Speaker and Senate 
leader are also killed, then the Cabinet 
member who becomes president should 
remain president for the remainder of the 
term, as the Constitution prescribes, and as 
would increase the legitimacy of the succes-
sion in the eyes of the American people. (See 
recommendation 3 on special elections. )
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Second, if Congressional leaders remain, the 
current system of selecting the President pro 
tempore should be changed.  The most sensible 
system would be for the Majority Leader to take 
this place in the line.  But the Leader is not an 
officer of Congress the way a Speaker is. 
Nonetheless, Congress could give its Majority 
Leader the title of president pro tempore.  Or it 
could choose the President pro tempore on some 
basis other than seniority in the majority party, 
with an eye to who would be the best successor 
to the President in a crisis.
Third, short of removing the leaders, Congress 
should change the line of succession so that 
the congressional leaders will only be in the 
line of succession for the death of a president, 
but not for the incapacitation, a scenario in 
which their assumption would cause much 
confusion.  Congress could also choose to pre-
vent congressional leaders from taking charge 
in the case of impeachment of the President, a 
situation in which some leaders might stand 
to gain.
Finally, Congress should fix congressional con-
tinuity.  As outlined in our earlier report, 
Congress would face its own formidable prob-
lems in the event of an attack that killed a large 
number of its members.  In this context, the 
reconstitution of Congress is also important 
because the congressional leaders chosen after 
the attack might succeed the presidency. 
Congress should allow the appointment of tem-
porary officials to fill vacancies in the House of 
Representative so that Congress can continue 
functioning after an attack. Also, the House 
should clarify the processes through which 
vacancies in the speakership are filled, keeping 
in mind that a new speaker could automatically 
assume the presidency. If the speakership were 
to automatically devolve onto minor members of 
the House, America could see a relatively insig-
nificant political figure elevated to the presi-
dency.  The House should ensure that no 
individual will assume the presidency without a 
vote in the full House of Representatives, not by 
fiat or by the vote of an unrepresentative hand-
ful of surviving lawmakers.
3.  Special Election for President
The Constitution allows for a special presiden-
tial election if the President and the Vice 
President are killed.  Similarly, the first 
Presidential Succession Act allowed for such an 
election.  But subsequent succession acts have 
not included such a provision. Congress should 
reform our current law to provide for a special 
election within five months if a simultaneous 
vacancy of the presidency and vice presidency 
occurs in the first two years of a presidential 
term.  Were such an election not to occur, the 
interim successor should serve until the end of 
the term.
4. Reorder the Line of Succession.
The order of the line of succession should be 
reconsidered.  Since the line of succession was 
established by the 1947 Presidential Succession 
Act, the only changes have been to add the 
secretaries of the newly created departments to 
the end of the line. In fact, all of the Cabinet 
officers are arranged in the order of the creation 
of their departments.  While the chronology of 
the creation of the departments might be a 
rough guide to their relative importance, 
Congress should not follow this formula blindly. 
It should think again from scratch what the best 
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order of succession is, especially considering 
the emergence of the real possibility of a cata-
strophic attack on Washington.
The “Big Four” departments should then be 
examined and reordered to best address a cata-
strophic attack.  It is unlikely that both the 
President and the Vice President would die simul-
taneously except in the event of an outside attack. 
The commission therefore recommends that the 
order of succession start with the Secretary of 
State to be followed by the Secretary of Defense, 
Attorney General and the Secretary of Treasury.
The commission also recommends that the 
lower profile cabinet members be replaced by 
the offices created for figures outside of 
Washington [see recommendation #1].  The 
lower profile cabinet officials are often picked 
for their expertise in a particular policy area, 
are less well known than the “Big Four” cabinet 
members, and are less intimately involved in 
matters of national security that would be para-
mount at the time of an attack.
5. Congress Should Remove Acting 
Secretaries from the Line of Succession
The Second Presidential Succession Act (in 
place from 1877 to 1947) explicitly stated that 
only department heads confirmed by the Senate 
for the position of department head were in the 
line of succession.  The current act, however, 
can easily cause confusion as it allows for 
acting secretaries who were confirmed by the 
Senate for lower level posts to be in the line of 
succession.  The current line of succession is 
also particularly ambiguous around the inaugu-
ration when a number of departments are briefly 
headed by acting secretaries pending the con-
firmation of cabinet secretaries in the new 
administration.
6. Clarify Procedures for Incapacitation, 
Especially for Lower Profile Officials in 
the Line of Succession
A catastrophic attack may involve serious injury 
to the President and the deaths of others in the 
line of succession.  While procedures for a vice 
president taking over for an incapacitated pres-
ident are well laid out by the 25th Amendment, 
procedures for succession by lower officials are 
not.  Congress has the authority to legally pre-
scribe the exact procedure for a lesser cabinet 
official taking over for an incapacitated presi-
dent.  The law probably could not require the 
lower level official to obtain the consent of other 
cabinet members, as this is a constitutional 
provision of the 25th Amendment provided for 
the Vice President.  But it could provide guid-
ance as to how the transfer might take place and 
how Congress is to be notified.
Further, Congress should clarify what would 
happen if a majority of the cabinet were unavail-
able for the Vice President to consult with when 
a president is incapacitated.  Under a provision 
of the 25th Amendment, Congress could specify 
an alternative body with which the Vice President 
could consult and obtain a majority in order to 
take over the presidency.  For example, Congress 
could indicate that in case the Vice President is 
unable to secure a  majority of the cabinet due to 
death or incapacity, the Vice President shall 
secure a majority of governors or another body 
outside of Washington.52 
52  Fortier, John C. “President Michael Armacost?: The Continuity of 
Government after September 11,” The Brookings Institution, Fall 2003 and 
Fortier, John C. and Ornstein, Norman J. “If Terrorists Attacked Our 
Presidential Elections,” Election Law Journal, Winter 2004, 3(4): 597-612.
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7. Fix Inaugural and Pre-inaugural 
Scenarios
Congress and the political parties should take 
preventative measures to secure the line of suc-
cession in the very dangerous times both during 
and before the inauguration.  Congress must not 
allow a gap of even several hours during which 
the line of succession for an incoming president 
has not yet been established and the outgoing 
president’s cabinet has resigned.
This could be accomplished simply through 
cooperation between the outgoing president and 
the incoming president – representing a mere 
change in custom, rather than a change in law. 
The outgoing president could submit the names 
of several of the incoming president’s cabinet 
nominees to the Senate and the Senate could 
then convene and confirm these nominees on 
the day before the inauguration or the morning 
of January 20th. This way there would be an 
established line of succession at the inaugural 
ceremony. Additionally, several members of the 
line might be sent out of town for the ceremony. 
If recommendation #1, the appointment of offi-
cers in the line of succession who would live 
outside of Washington were adopted, the Senate 
could also confirm these figures before the 
inauguration, as the congressional hearings 
presumably would have been completed in 
early January.
The commission also recommends shortening 
as much as possible the period between the 
casting of electoral votes and their counting by 
Congress.  These dates are relics of an earlier 
era when communications were slower and less 
reliable than they are today.  Congress should 
move the date on which the electors meet to cast 
their votes closer to January 6th, leaving at most 
a gap of one or two days.  This interim period 
breeds confusion because there is no formal 
president-elect, even though the electors’ 
choices are now obvious. 
Finally, political parties should plan for the 
possibility of the death of their president-elect 
and vice president-elect.  They should reexam-
ine their procedures for selecting a new nomi-
nee to send to the electors in the event of the 
death of a nominee.  Such procedures should be 
designed so as to make the selection of nomi-
nees as broadly acceptable as possible to pre-





It is our earnest hope that events never transpire 
that would put the presidency to the extreme 
tests considered above. But, however unlikely 
some of the scenarios we outline may be, the 
paramount importance of the American chief 
executive makes it incumbent upon us to ensure 
the office’s functionality even in the most dire of 
circumstances. Leaving the American govern-
ment vulnerable in the face of a catastrophic 
attack – no matter how improbable a scenario 
– is irresponsible. We hope our recommenda-
tions will be weighed with care.
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Article I Section V of the United States 
Constitution
Section 5. Each House shall be the judge of the 
elections, returns and qualifications of its own 
members, and a majority of each shall consti-
tute a quorum to do business; but a smaller 
number may adjourn from day to day, and may 
be authorized to compel the attendance of 
absent members, in such manner, and under 
such penalties as each House may provide. 
Each House may determine the rules of its pro-
ceedings, punish its members for disorderly 
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two 
thirds, expel a member. 
Each House shall keep a journal of its proceed-
ings, and from time to time publish the same, 
excepting such parts as may in their judgment 
require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the 
members of either House on any question shall, 
at the desire of one fifth of those present, be 
entered on the journal. 
Neither House, during the session of Congress, 
shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for 
more than three days, nor to any other place than 
that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. 
Article II Section 1 of the United States 
Constitution
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested 
in a president of the United States of America. 
He shall hold his office during the term of four 
years, and, together with the Vice President, 
chosen for the same term, be elected, as 
follows: 
Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a number of 
electors, equal to the whole number of Senators 
and Representatives to which the State may be 
entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or 
Representative, or person holding an office of 
trust or profit under the United States, shall be 
appointed an elector. 
The electors shall meet in their respective 
states, and vote by ballot for two persons, of 
whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant 
of the same state with themselves. And they 
shall make a list of all the persons voted for, 
and of the number of votes for each; which 
list they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the government of the 
United States, directed to the President of the 





the presence of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, open all the certificates, 
and the votes shall then be counted. The 
person having the greatest number of votes 
shall be the President, if such number be a 
majority of the whole number of electors 
appointed; and if there be more than one who 
have such majority, and have an equal number 
of votes, then the House of Representatives 
shall immediately choose by ballot one of 
them for president; and if no person have a 
majority, then from the five highest on the list 
the said House shall in like manner choose 
the President. But in choosing the President, 
the votes shall be taken by States, the repre-
sentation from each state having one vote; a 
quorum for this purpose shall consist of a 
member or members from two thirds of the 
states, and a majority of all the states shall be 
necessary to a choice. In every case, after the 
choice of the President, the person having the 
greatest number of votes of the electors shall 
be the Vice President. But if there should 
remain two or more who have equal votes, the 
Senate shall choose from them by ballot the 
Vice President. 
The Congress may determine the time of choos-
ing the electors, and the day on which they shall 
give their votes; which day shall be the same 
throughout the United States. 
No person except a natural born citizen, or a 
citizen of the United States, at the time of the 
adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible 
to the office of president; neither shall any 
person be eligible to that office who shall not 
have attained to the age of thirty five years, 
and been fourteen years a resident within the 
United States. 
In case of the removal of the President from 
office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to 
discharge the powers and duties of the said 
office, the same shall devolve on the Vice 
President, and the Congress may by law provide 
for the case of removal, death, resignation or 
inability, both of the President and Vice 
President, declaring what officer shall then act 
as president, and such officer shall act accord-
ingly, until the disability be removed, or a 
president shall be elected. 
The President shall, at stated times, receive for 
his services, a compensation, which shall nei-
ther be increased nor diminished during the 
period for which he shall have been elected, 
and he shall not receive within that period any 
other emolument from the United States, or any 
of them. 
Before he enter on the execution of his office, 
he shall take the following oath or affirmation - 
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faith-
fully execute the office of President of the 
United States, and will to the best of my ability, 
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of 
the United States.”
Amendment XII
The electors shall meet in their respective 
states and vote by ballot for president and 
vice-president, one of whom, at least, shall 
not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots 
the person voted for as president, and in dis-
tinct ballots the person voted for as vice-
president, and they shall make distinct lists of 
all persons voted for as president, and of all 
persons voted for as vice-president, and of the 
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number of votes for each, which lists they 
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to 
the seat of the government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate 
- The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, open all the certificates and 
the votes shall then be counted - the person 
having the greatest number of votes for presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number 
be a majority of the whole number of electors 
appointed; and if no person have such major-
ity, then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of 
those voted for as president, the House of 
Representatives shall choose immediately, by 
ballot, the President. But in choosing the 
President, the votes shall be taken by states, 
the representation from each state having one 
vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist 
of a member or members from two-thirds of 
the states, and a majority of all the states shall 
be necessary to a choice. And if the House of 
Representatives shall not choose a president 
whenever the right of choice shall devolve 
upon them, before the fourth day of March 
next following, then the Vice-President shall 
act as president, as in the case of the death or 
other constitutional disability of the President. 
The person having the greatest number of 
votes as vice-president, shall be the Vice-
President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of electors appointed, and if no 
person have a majority, then from the two 
highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall 
choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the 
whole number of Senators, and a majority of 
the whole number shall be necessary to a 
choice. But no person constitutionally ineli-
gible to the office of president shall be eligible 
to that of vice-president of the United States. 
Amendment XVII
The Senate of the United States shall be com-
posed of two Senators from each state, elected 
by the people thereof, for six years; and each 
Senator shall have one vote. The electors in 
each state shall have the qualifications requi-
site for electors of the most numerous branch 
of the state legislatures. 
When vacancies happen in the representation 
of any state in the Senate, the executive 
authority of such state shall issue writs of elec-
tion to fill such vacancies: Provided, that the 
legislature of any state may empower the 
executive thereof to make temporary appoint-
ments until the people fill the vacancies by 
election as the legislature may direct. 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to 
affect the election or term of any Senator chosen 
before it becomes valid as part of the 
Constitution. 
Amendment XX
Section 1. The terms of the President and Vice 
President shall end at noon on the 20th day of 
January, and the terms of Senators and 
Representatives at noon on the 3d day of 
January, of the years in which such terms 
would have ended if this article had not been 
ratified; and the terms of their successors shall 
then begin. 
Section 2. The Congress shall assemble at least 
once in every year, and such meeting shall 
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begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless 
they shall by law appoint a different day. 
Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the begin-
ning of the term of the President, the President 
elect shall have died, the Vice President elect 
shall become president. If a president shall not 
have been chosen before the time fixed for the 
beginning of his term, or if the President elect 
shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice 
President elect shall act as president until a 
president shall have qualified; and the 
Congress may by law provide for the case 
wherein neither a president elect nor a vice 
president elect shall have qualified, declaring 
who shall then act as president, or the manner 
in which one who is to act shall be selected, 
and such person shall act accordingly until 
a president or vice president shall have 
qualified.
 
Section 4. The Congress may by law provide 
for the case of the death of any of the persons 
from whom the House of Representatives may 
choose a president whenever the right of 
choice shall have devolved upon them, and for 
the case of the death of any of the persons from 
whom the Senate may choose a vice president 
whenever the right of choice shall have 
devolved upon them. 
Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on 
the 15th day of October following the ratifica-
tion of this article. 
Section 6. This article shall be inoperative 
unless it shall have been ratified as an amend-
ment to the Constitution by the legislatures of 
three-fourths of the several states within seven 
years from the date of its submission.
Amendment XXV
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President 
from office or of his death or resignation, the 
Vice President shall become president. 
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the 
office of the Vice President, the President shall 
nominate a vice president who shall take office 
upon confirmation by a majority vote of both 
Houses of Congress. 
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to 
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives his 
written declaration that he is unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his office, and 
until he transmits to them a written declaration 
to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be 
discharged by the Vice President as acting 
president. 
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a 
majority of either the principal officers of the 
executive departments or of such other body as 
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives their 
written declaration that the President is unable 
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, 
the Vice President shall immediately assume 
the powers and duties of the office as acting 
president. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives his 
written declaration that no inability exists, he 
shall resume the powers and duties of his 
office unless the Vice President and a majority 
The Presidency 57
of either the principal officers of the executive 
department or of such other body as Congress 
may by law provide, transmit within four days 
to the President pro tempore of the Senate and 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
their written declaration that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide 
the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours 
for that purpose if not in session. If the 
Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt 
of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress 
is not in session, within twenty-one days after 
Congress is required to assemble, determines 
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office, the Vice President 
shall continue to discharge the same as acting 
President; otherwise, the President shall 
resume the powers and duties of his office.  
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United States Code, Title 28, Chapter 1, 
Section 1. Number of justices; quorum 
The Supreme Court of the United States shall 
consist of a Chief Justice of the United States 
and eight associate justices, any six of whom 
shall constitute a quorum.
Presidential Succession Act of 1792
1) Vice President
2) President of the Senate pro tempore
3) Speaker of the House of Representatives
4) [Special Election for President]
CHAP. VIII.  An act relative to the Election of a 
President and Vice President of the United States, 
and declaring the Officer who shall act as 
President in case if Vacancies in the offices both 
of President and Vice President. (March 1, 1792)
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and 
House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That except in 
case of an election of a President and Vice 
President of the United States, prior to the ordi-
nary period as herein after specified, electors 
shall be appointed in each state for the election 
of a President and Vice President of the United 
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States, within thirty-four days preceding the first 
Wednesday in December, one thousand seven 
hundred and ninety-two, and within thirty-four 
days preceding the first Wednesday in December 
in every fourth year succeeding the last election, 
which electors shall be equal to the number of 
Senators and Representatives, to which the sev-
eral states may by law be entitled at the time, 
when the President and Vice President, thus to 
be chosen, should come into office: Provided 
always, That where no apportionment of 
Representatives shall have been made after any 
enumeration, at the time of choosing electors, 
then the number of electors shall be according to 
the existing apportionment of Senators and 
Representatives. 
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the 
electors shall meet and give their votes on the 
said first Wednesday in December, at such 
place in each state as shall be directed, by the 
legislature thereof; and the electors in each 
state shall make and sign three certificates of all 
the votes by them given, and shall seal up the 
same certifying on each that a list of the votes of 
such state for President and Vice President is 
contained therein, and shall by writing under 
their hands, or under the hands of a majority of 
them, appoint a person to take charge of and 
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deliver to the President of the Senate, at the 
seat of government, before the first Wednesday 
in January then next ensuing, one of the said 
certificates, and the said electors shall forthwith 
forward by the post-office to the President of the 
Senate, at the seat of government, one other of 
the said certificates, and shall forthwith cause 
the other of the said certificates to be delivered 
to the judge of that district in which the said 
electors shall assemble. 
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the 
executive authority of each state shall cause 
three lists of the names of the electors of such 
state to be made and certified and to be deliv-
ered to the electors on or before the said first 
Wednesday in December, and the said electors 
shall annex one of the said lists to each of the 
lists of their votes.
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That if a list 
of votes, from any state, shall not have been 
received at the seat of government on the said 
first Wednesday in January, that then the 
Secretary of State shall send a special messen-
ger to the district judge in whose custody such 
list shall have been lodged, who shall forthwith 
transmit the same to the seat of government.
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That Congress 
shall be in session on the second Wednesday in 
February, one thousand seven hundred and 
ninety-three, and on the second Wednesday in 
February succeeding every meeting of the elec-
tors, and the said certificates, or so many of 
them as shall have been received, shall then be 
opened, the votes counted, and the persons who 
shall fill the offices of President and Vice 
President ascertained and declared, agreeably 
to the constitution.
SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That in case 
there shall be no President of the Senate at the 
seat of government on the arrival of the persons 
entrusted with the lists of the votes of the electors, 
then such persons shall deliver the lists of votes in 
their custody into the office of the Secretary of 
State, to be safely kept and delivered over as soon 
as may be, to the President of the Senate. 
SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That the 
persons appointed by the electors to deliver the 
lists of votes to the President of the Senate, 
shall be allowed on the delivery of the said lists 
twenty-five cents for every mile of the estimated 
distance by the most usual road, from the place 
of meeting of the electors, to the seat of govern-
ment of the United States.
SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That if any 
person appointed to deliver the votes of the elec-
tors to the President of the Senate, shall after 
accepting of his appointment neglect to perform 
the services required of him by this act, he shall 
forfeit the sum of one thousand dollars.
SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That in case 
of removal, death, resignation or inability both of 
the President and Vice President of the United 
States, the President of the Senate pro tempore, 
and in case there shall be no President of the 
Senate, then the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, for the time being shall act as 
President of the United States until the disability 
be removed or a President shall be elected.  
SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That when-
ever the offices of President and Vice President 
shall both become vacant, the Secretary of State 
shall forthwith cause a notification thereof to be 
made to the executive of every state, and shall also 
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cause the same to be published in at least one of 
the newspapers printed in each state, specifying 
that electors of the President of the United States 
shall be appointed or chosen in the several states 
within thirty-four days preceding the first 
Wednesday in December then next ensuing: 
Provided, There shall be the space of two months 
between the date of such notification and the said 
first Wednesday in December, but if there shall 
not be the space of two months between the date 
of such notification and the first Wednesday in 
December; and if the term for which the President 
and Vice President last in office were elected shall 
not expire on the third day of March next ensuing, 
then the Secretary of State shall specify in the 
notification that the electors shall be appointed or 
chosen within thirty-four days preceding the first 
Wednesday in December in the year next ensuing, 
within which time the electors shall accordingly 
be appointed or chosen, and the electors shall 
meet and give their votes on the said first 
Wednesday in December, and the proceedings 
and duties of the said electors and others shall be 
pursuant to the directions prescribed in this act.
SEC. 11. And be it further enacted, That the 
only evidence of refusal to accept or of a resig-
nations of the Office of President and Vice 
President, shall be an instrument in writing 
declaring the same, and sub-scribed by the 
person refusing to accept or resigning, as the 
case may be, and delivered into the office of the 
Secretary of State.
SEC. 12. And be it further enacted, That the 
term of four years for which a President and 
Vice President shall be elected shall in all 
cases commence on the fourth day of March 
next succeeding the day on which the votes of 
the electors shall have been given.
CHAPT. XVII – An Act to authorize the 
President of the United States in certain 
cases to alter the place for holding a session 
of Congress. (Approved April 3, 1794)
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in 
congress assembled, That whenever the Congress 
shall be about to convene, and, from the preva-
lence of contagious sickness, or the existence of 
other circumstances, it would in the opinion of the 
President of the United States, be hazardous to the 
lives or health of the members to meet at the place 
to which the Congress shall then stand adjourned, 
or at which it shall be next by law to meet, the 
President shall be, and he hereby is authorized, by 
proclamation, to convene the Congress at such 
other place as he may judge proper.
Presidential Succession Act of 1886
1) Vice President
2) Secretary of State
3) Secretary of Treasury
4) Secretary of War
5) Attorney-General
6) Postmaster-General
7) Secretary of the Navy
8) Secretary of the Interior
CHAP. 4.- An act to provide for the performance 
of the duties of tie office of President in case of the 
removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the 
President  and Vice-President. - Jan 19, 1886.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled, That in case of removal, 
death, resignation, or inability of both the President 
and Vice-President of the United States, the 
Secretary of State, or if there be none, or in case of 
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his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then 
the Secretary of Treasury, or if there be none, or in 
case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, 
then the Secretary of War, or if there be none, or in 
case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, 
then the Attorney-General, or if there be none, or 
in case of his removal, death, resignation, or 
inability, then the Postmaster-General, or if there 
be none, or in case of his removal, death, resigna-
tion, or inability, then the Secretary of the Navy, or 
if there be none, or in case of his removal, death, 
resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the 
Interior, shall act as President until the disability 
of the President or Vice-President is removed or a 
President shall be elected: Provided, That when-
ever the powers and duties of the office of President 
of the United States shall devolve upon any of the 
persons named herein, if Congress be not then in 
session, or if it would not meet in accordance with 
law within twenty days thereafter, it shall be the 
duty of the person upon whom said powers and 
duties shall devolve to issue a proclamation con-
vening Congress ‘in extraordinary session, giving 
twenty days’ notice of the time of meeting.  
SEC. 2. That the preceding section shall only be 
held to describe and apply to such officers as shall 
have been appointed by the advice and consent of 
the Senate to the offices therein named, and such 
as are eligible to the office of President under the 
Constitution and not under impeachment by the 
House of Representatives of the United States at 
the time the powers and duties of the office shall 
devolve upon them respectively. 
SEC. 3. That sections one hundred and forty-six, 
one hundred and forty-seven, one hundred and 
forty-eight, one hundred and forty-nine and one 
hundred and fifty of the Revised Statutes are 
hereby repealed.
Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (as 
amended through 2002)
1) Vice President
2) Speaker of the House
3) President pro tempore
4) Secretary of State
5) Secretary of the Treasury
6) Secretary of Defense
7) Attorney General
8) Secretary of the Interior
9) Secretary of Agriculture
10) Secretary of Commerce
11) Secretary of Labor
12) Secretary of Health and Human Services
13) Secretary of Housing and Urban      
     Development
14) Secretary of Transportation
15) Secretary of Energy
16) Secretary of Education
17) Secretary of Veterans Affairs
18) Secretary of Homeland Security
SEC 19. Vacancy in offices of both President 
and Vice President; officers eligible to act
(a)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal 
from office, inability, or failure to qualify, there 
is neither a President nor Vice President to 
discharge the powers and duties of the office of 
President, then the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives shall, upon his resignation as 
Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act 
as President.
(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of 
the death, resignation, removal from office, 
or inability of an individual acting as 
President under this subsection.
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(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of 
this section a Speaker is to begin the discharge 
of the powers and duties of the office of 
President, there is no Speaker, or the Speaker 
fails to qualify as Acting President, then the 
President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon 
his resignation as President pro tempore and as 
Senator, act as President.
(c) An individual acting as President under 
subsection (a) or subsection (b) of this section 
shall continue to act until the expiration of the 
then current Presidential term, except that- 
(1) if his discharge of the powers and duties 
of the office is founded in whole or in part 
on the failure of both the President-elect 
and the Vice-President-elect  to qualify, 
then he shall act only until a President or 
Vice President qualifies; and
(2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of 
the office is founded in whole or in part on the 
inability of the President or Vice President, 
then he shall act only until the  removal of the 
disability of one of such individuals.
(d)(1)  If, by reason of death, resignation, removal 
from office, inability, or failure to qualify, there is 
no President pro tempore to act as President 
under subsection (b) of this section, then the 
officer of the United States who is  highest on the 
following list, and who is not under disability to 
discharge the powers and duties of the office of 
President shall act as President: Secretary of 
State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of 
Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the 
Interior, Secretary of Agriculture,   Secretary of 
Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of 
Transportation, Secretary  of Energy, Secretary of 
Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 
Secretary of Homeland Security.
(2)  An individual acting as President under 
this subsection shall continue so to do until 
the expiration of the then current Presidential 
term, but not after a qualified and prior-
entitled individual is able to act, except that 
the removal of the disability of an individual 
higher on the list contained in paragraph (1) 
of this subsection or the ability to qualify on 
the part of an individual higher on such list 
shall not terminate his service.
(3) The taking of the oath of office by an 
individual specified in the list in paragraph 
(1) of this subsection shall be held to con-
stitute his resignation from the office by 
virtue of the holding of which he qualifies 
to act as President.
(e)  Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section 
shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to 
the office of President under the Constitution. 
Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to 
officers appointed, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the 
death, resignation, removal from office, inability, 
or failure to qualify, of the President pro tempore, 
and only to officers not under impeachment by 
the House of Representatives at the time the 
powers and duties of the office of President 
devolve upon them.
(f) During the period that any individual acts as 
President under this section, his compensation 
shall be at the rate then provided by law in the 
case of the President.
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U.S. Constitution, Article I Section 3
…if vacancies happen by resignation, or oth-
erwise, during the recess of the legislature of 
any state, the executive thereof may make 
temporary appointments until the next meet-
ing of the legislature, which shall then fill 
such vacancies. 
U.S. Constitution, 17th Amendment
When vacancies happen in the representation 
of any state in the Senate, the executive author-
ity of such state shall issue writs of election to 
fill such vacancies: Provided, that the legisla-
ture of any state may empower the executive 
thereof to make temporary appointments until 
the people fill the vacancies by election as the 
legislature may direct. 
2 U.S.C. Sec. 8. Vacancies
The time for holding elections in any State, 
district, or territory for a Representative or 
Delegate to fill a vacancy, whether such 
vacancy is caused by a failure to elect at the 
time prescribed by law, or by the death, resig-
nation, or incapacity of a person elected, may 
be prescribed by the laws of the several States 
and territories respectively.
Federal Provisions for Filling Senate Vacancies
Appendix III
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To the Congress of the United States: 
I think that this is an appropriate time for the 
Congress to reexamine the question of the 
Presidential succession. 
The question is of great importance now because 
there will be no elected Vice President for 
almost four years. 
The existing statute governing the succession to 
the office of President was enacted in 1886. 
Under it, in the event of the death of the elected 
President and Vice President, members of the 
Cabinet successively fill the office. 
Each of these Cabinet members is appointed 
by the President with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. In effect, therefore, by reason 
of the tragic death of the late President, it 
now lies within my power to nominate the 
person who would be my immediate successor 
in the event of my own death or inability 
to act. 
I do not believe that in a democracy this power 
should rest with the Chief Executive. 
In so far as possible, the office of the President 
should be filled by an elective officer. There is 
no officer in our system of government, besides 
the President and Vice President, who has been 
elected by all the voters of the country. 
The Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
who is elected in his own district, is also elected 
to be the presiding officer of the House by a 
vote of all the Representatives of all the people 
of the country. As a result, I believe that the 
Speaker is the official in the Federal Government, 
whose selection next to that of the President and 
Vice President, can be most accurately said to 
stem from the people themselves. 
Under the law of 1792, the President Pro 
Tempore of the Senate followed the Vice 
President in the order of succession. 
The President Pro Tempore is elected as a 
Senator by his State and then as presiding offi-
cer by the Senate. But the members of the 
Senate are not as closely tied in by the elective 
process to the people as are the members of the 
House of Representatives. A completely new 
House is elected every two years, and always at 
President Truman’s Special Message to the 




the same time as the President and Vice 
President. Usually it is in agreement politically 
with the Chief Executive. 
Only one third of the Senate, however, is elected 
with the President and Vice President. The Senate 
might, therefore, have a majority hostile to the 
policies of the President, and might conceivably 
fill the Presidential office with one not in sympa-
thy with the will of the majority of the people. 
Some of the events in the impeachment pro-
ceedings of President Johnson suggested the 
possibility of a hostile Congress in the future 
seeking to oust a Vice President who had 
become President, in order to have the President 
Pro Tempore of the Senate become the President. 
This was one of the considerations, among sev-
eral others, which led to the change in 1886. 
No matter who succeeds to the Presidency after 
the death of the elected President and Vice 
President, it is my opinion he should not serve 
any longer than until the next Congressional 
election or until a special election called for the 
purpose of electing a new President and Vice 
President. This period the Congress should fix. 
The individuals elected at such general or spe-
cial election should then serve only to fill the 
unexpired term of the deceased President and 
Vice President. In this way there would be no 
interference with the normal four-year interval 
of general national elections. 
I recommend, therefore, that the Congress enact 
legislation placing the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives first in order of succession in 
case of the removal, death, resignation or 
inability to act of the President and Vice 
President. Of course, the Speaker should resign 
as a Representative in the Congress as well as 
Speaker of the House before he assumes the 
office of President. 
If there is no qualified Speaker, or if the Speaker 
fails to qualify, then I recommend that the suc-
cession pass to the President Pro Tempore of 
the Senate, who should hold office until a duly 
qualified Speaker is elected. 
If there be neither Speaker nor President Pro 
Tempore qualified to succeed on the creation of 
the vacancy, then the succession might pass to 
the members of the Cabinet as now provided, 
until a duly qualified Speaker is elected. 
If the Congress decides that a special election 
should be held, then I recommend that it pro-
vide for such election to be held as soon after 
the death or disqualification of the President 
and Vice President as practicable. The method 
and procedure for holding such special election 
should be provided now by law, so that the elec-
tion can be held as expeditiously as possible 
should the contingency arise. 
In the interest of orderly, democratic govern-
ment, I urge the Congress to give its early 
consideration to this most important subject.
HARRY S. TRUMAN
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Source:  Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential Succession, Fordham University Press, New 












         Length of Vice-
      Presidential Vacancy
George 
Clinton March 4, 1809-1813 April 20, 1812 Death 0 years, 10 months, 12 days
Elbridge 
Gerry March 4, 1813-1817 November 23, 1814 Death 2 years, 3 months, 9 days
John C. 
Calhoun March 4, 1829-1833 December 28, 1832 Resignation 0 years, 2 months, 4 days
John Tyler March 4, 1841-1845 April 4, 1841 Succession 3 years, 11 months, 0 days
Millard 
Fillmore March 4, 1849-1853 July 9, 1850 Succession 2 years, 7 months, 23 days
William R. 
King March 4, 1853-1857 April 18, 1853 Death 3 years, 10 months, 14 days
Andrew 
Johnson March 4, 1865-1869 April 15, 1865 Succession 3 years, 10 months, 17 days
Henry Wilson March 4, 1873-1877 November 22, 1875 Death 1 year, 3 months, 10 days
Chester A. 
Arthur March 4, 1881-1885 September 19, 1881 Succession 3 years, 5 months, 13 days
Thomas A. 
Hendricks March 4, 1885-1889 November 25, 1885 Death 3 years, 3 months, 7 days
Garret A. 
Hobart March 4, 1897-1901 November 21, 1889 Death 1 year, 3 months, 11 days
Theodore 
Roosevelt March 4, 1901-1905 September 14, 1901 Succession 3 years, 5 months, 18 days
James S. 
Sherman March 4, 1909-1913 October 30, 1912 Death 0 years, 4 months, 5 days
Calvin 
Coolidge March 4, 1921-1925 August 2, 1923 Succession 1 year, 7 months, 2 days
Harry S. 
Truman January 20, 1945-1949 April 12, 1945 Succession 3 years, 9 months, 8 days
Lyndon B. 
Johnson January 20, 1961-1965 November 22, 1963 Succession 1 year, 1 month, 29 days
*Spiro Agnew January 20, 1969-1977 October 10, 1973 Resignation 0 years, 1 month, 26 days
*Gerald Ford October 12, 1973- January 20, 1977 August 9, 1974 Succession 0 years, 4 months, 10 days
Source:  Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential Succession, Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. (*addition; 
please note: Gerald Ford was never elected. He assumed the presidency upon Richard Nixon's resignation. There was an additional 2 day 
vacancy between Spiro Agnew’s resignation and Gerald Ford’s assumption of the powers of the Vice Presidency on October 12, 1973). 
[original and additions reprinted with permission from the author].
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Summary of Central Recommendation
PROBLEM:  The current constitutional and 
legal provisions fail to take into account the 
possibility of a catastrophic attack on 
Washington, D.C. Since all individuals 
included in the Presidential line of succession 
are based in our nation’s capital, a catastrophic 
attack on the city could potentially kill or 
incapacitate many if not all of these individu-
als and cause significant confusion about who 
can assume the powers of the presidency. 
With the inclusion of members of Congress 
and acting cabinet secretaries in the line of 
succession, all of whom must resign from their 
current positions before assuming the presi-
dency and can then be “bumped” from the 
presidency by an individual ranking higher in 
the line of succession, it is possible to have no 
one remaining in the line of succession. 
Current procedures leave our nation especially 
vulnerable at presidential inaugurations and 
State of the Union Addresses.
RECOMMENDATION: A reordering of the 
Presidential line of succession to: Vice 
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the 
Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney 
General, followed by four or five newly appointed 
individuals residing outside of Washington, 
D.C.  A dual vacancy in the presidency and vice 
presidency during the first two years of a term 
should trigger a special election within five 
months. The winner of the election would serve 
the remainder of the term and would displace 
the temporary successor. 
The commission recommends removing 
Congressional leaders and acting secretaries 
from the line of succession to limit confusion 
over who can assume power.  It also recom-
mends reducing the time between the casting 
and counting of electoral votes as well as for 
Congress to clarify procedures for incapacita-
tion and create guidelines for continuity in the 
event of an attack at the presidential inaugura-
tion or during the time period before the inau-
guration.  If possible, the outgoing president 
should appoint some or all of the incoming 
president’s cabinet nominees prior to the inau-
guration to ensure individuals will remain in 
the line of succession. The commission believes 
these changes to the current provisions are 
necessary to ensure continuity of the United 
States’ Presidency when our nation is most 
vulnerable.
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